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5 
Issues and Conclusions 
German-Russian Gas Relations 
A Special Relationship in Troubled Waters 
In the context of the security crisis in and over Ukraine, 
natural gas imports from Russia have become a source 
of debate in Germany and the European Union (EU). 
The large gas-import volumes – and especially an ex-
pansion of natural gas relations in the context of Nord 
Stream 2 – have been questioned in the political 
realm. The discourse reflects the concern that a more 
assertive Russia is projecting its power onto Germany 
and the EU – and that activities in the natural gas 
sector represent just one part of this strategy. Thus, 
the strategic German-Russian natural gas relationship 
is perceived as stemming from the past. Russian gas 
supplies are under scrutiny as being an antagonist to 
1) a more sustainable energy system, 2) a norm-based 
liberal political and economic order, and 3) as a major 
challenge to the process of EU integration. Geopolitics 
seem to prevail over commercial principles. 
We aim at explaining the nature and texture of the 
gas relations. In order to achieve a better understand-
ing, we analyze the political framing and the natural 
gas relations to grasp the (historical) paths, patterns, 
and drivers behind them. Natural gas relations are 
conducted within the political, institutional, legal, 
and regulatory framework(s) and are composed of the 
social-technical assemblages, infrastructure, commer-
cial transactions, and contractual relations. 
Historically, the Soviet-German gas-for-pipes deal 
was embedded into the German Ostpolitik. Concrete 
cooperation in the economic sphere was perceived as 
a major element of détente and “change through rap-
prochement” (Wandel durch Annäherung). Following 
German reunification and acknowledging Moscow’s 
key role, a strategic partnership was proclaimed in the 
early 1990s. In the 2000s, a “new Ostpolitik” succeeded 
the idea of “rapprochement through interdependence” 
(Annäherung durch Verflechtung). In 2008, a Moderni-
zation Partnership supplemented this Strategic Part-
nership, also in the energy field. Yet, disappointment 
and alienation crept into the relationship. As of 2009 
at the latest, German-Russian natural gas relations 
cannot be analyzed without including the EU, because 
this is when the Third Energy Package was introduced. 
Brussels has become a factor of change. Moreover, the 
EU enlargement of 2004 brought with it a more criti-
cal view of these relations, as did the Russian-Ukrain-
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6 
ian gas disputes in 2006 and 2009. Finally, external 
energy governance has shifted from the policy initia-
tives influenced by the idea of a common European 
market from Lisbon to Vladivostok to the export of 
the EU acquis communautaire to the neighborhood. 
Commercial gas relations have undergone a grand 
transformation as well. This is why the impression of 
ongoing “business as usual” is misleading. During the 
first phase, from the 1970s till the 1990s, gas trade was 
developed and supported politically to have positive 
spillover effects. In the 1990s the relationship trans-
formed into a commercial and business-driven rela-
tionship, which covered the whole value chain and 
resulted in vertically integrated, bilateral monopolies 
and a kind of special reciprocity. The big change came 
with the creation of the EU’s internal gas market and 
a gas glut that affected the business models of com-
panies’ gas undertakings and led to the loss of clear 
prospects. A low-price buyers’ market since 2009/2010 
and a gas supply surplus have fundamentally changed 
the behaviors of gas traders’ and consumers. 
It can be argued that the crisis in and over Ukraine 
has initiated a new phase. There have been overlaps of 
German and Russian political and economic interests 
in conducting gas relations in the past. A disconnect 
between political framing and economic interests has 
been growing, and the main paradigm of German fore-
ign policy has been “containment and cooperation.” 
Gas trade has remained a part of the second pillar of 
a dual strategy of containment and cooperation, but 
particular activities in the energy field have been 
sanctioned by the EU. 
For the Soviet Union, the natural gas industry 
became a centerpiece of its economic development in 
the 1970s and emerged as an issue of national pride 
and prestige. The spatial dimension established after 
the construction of an integrated Soviet pipeline sys-
tem replicated and ensured the political and economic 
integration of the Soviet republics, and later the Coun-
cil for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) coun-
tries. The pattern of building up the trade in natural 
gas and infrastructure ties was reproduced with West-
ern European countries – the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG) among them. Maximizing the revenues 
from resource wealth is in the DNA of any hydrocar-
bon producer. Thus, the approach of putting national 
sovereignty over natural resources – as well as using 
this lever for generating economic growth – has been 
Russia’s strategy since the beginning. Natural gas 
exports have been key to supplying domestic Russian 
consumers at subsidized and regulated prices. This 
explains why the gas industry has been, and remains, 
a vital and strategic sector. Moreover, especially under 
President Vladimir Putin’s terms in office, natural gas 
exports have been seen as a means to restoring foreign 
power and repositioning Russia in international affairs. 
However, the global gas glut since 2009 has hit Russia 
hard. Moscow had invested in gas fields in a different 
price environment and under the expectation fueled 
by the EU that gas demand would grow in Europe. Yet, 
while Germany’s relative importance as a market for 
Gazprom is increasing, its gas demand is flattening, at 
best. With respect to bilateral relations, the major take-
away is that a common idea, vision, and understand-
ing of how future gas relations will look are lacking. 
The incongruence of Russian-German developments 
is evident in their current natural gas relationship. 
We argue that commercial relations have become 
more complicated, instable, and uncertain than in the 
past. This weakens the stabilizing effect and may 
heighten the exposure to geopolitical instrumentali-
zation. Moreover, the number of potentially interven-
ing (f)actors – such as legal actions and regulatory 
changes in the EU, or the new U.S. sanctions regime in 
force since August 2017 – limits the German govern-
ment’s room for maneuver. 
If German-Russian gas relations are to be preserved 
as part of the economic cooperation, dialogue is essen-
tial in order to navigate the troubled waters. They 
should be supported by smaller, innovative lighthouse 
projects that are mutually attractive and beneficial 
(such as the use of bio/synthetic gas, gas in transport, 
cooperation to fight methane leakage, and agreement 
on improving efficiency in gas use). It is important to 
adapt gas relations to a low-carbon future and more 
integrated and liquid gas markets in the EU (and espe-
cially in Central European member states). Both have 
to look for new models of cooperation and, possibly, 
for new partnerships and new stakeholders (independ-
ent gas producers, power generators, municipalities, 
startups), both in Russia and Germany. It is thus highly 
problematic that German-Russian gas relations are 
being overshadowed by the Nord Stream 2 issue. 
With regard to the political framing in Germany, 
adopting a pragmatic attitude seems to be the right way 
forward – Germany should not have high expectations 
about positive spillovers into the security realm, but 
rather emphasize the value of economic cooperation 
as one pillar of a dual strategy of containment and co-
operation. With regard to Russia, any moves and rheto-
ric to let geopolitics prevail over commercial logic will 
heighten the level of sensitivity, also in Germany. 
 SWP Berlin 
German-Russian Gas Relations 
A Special Relationship in Troubled Waters 
December 2017 
 
 
7 
Framing the Topic of German-Russian Gas Relations 
 
Guiding Questions and the 
Analytical Approach 
For more than 40 years, German-Russian natural gas 
relations have been embedded into a broader relation-
ship,1 in which détente, confidence, and trust-building 
were perceived as a function of economic interdepend-
ence, and the gas-for-pipes deal became part of the Ost-
politik.2 Thus, traditionally, German-Russian natural 
gas relations have had a certain political significance 
and been entangled within the economic, political, 
and social ties. 
Our focus on a partnership of “longue durée” aims 
to grasp the density, patterns, and dynamics of the 
relationship. Our hypothesis is that the relationship 
has been subject to dynamic changes, not only via gas 
market regulations in the EU, but also the German 
Energiewende and rapidly changing global markets, 
which will continue to transform German-Russian gas 
relations. We argue that, even prior to the crisis in and 
over Ukraine, natural gas relations have become more 
complicated. This research paper is about German-
Russian gas relations, but we believe the EU is a major 
factor, as it has had a fundamental impact on the 
legal and regulatory frameworks as well as the market 
structures, and it has also influenced the political 
framing. We take note of studies arguing that Russia 
has used energy as a tool in the former Soviet Union 
and in the former COMECON.3 Since the crisis in and 
over Ukraine foreign policy, geopolitical considera-
tions seem to (at least periodically) prevail over mar-
ket-based transactions – this is an observation that can 
be backed by the 2014 statement of the Kremlin to by-
 
1 This Research Paper was prepared over the course of 2016/ 
2017 as part of a project financed by the German Federal For-
eign Office. We want to thank the participants of the project 
for extensive and interesting discussions. The project was led 
by Kirsten Westphal and co-chaired by Tatiana Mitrova. 
2 Per Högselius, Red Gas. Russia and the Origins of European Energy 
Dependence (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 105–34. 
3 See e.g.: Robert L. Larsson, Russian Energy Policy: Security Di-
mensions and Russia’s Reliability as an Energy Supplier (Stockholm: 
Swedish Defense Research Agency [FOI], 2006); Gabriel Col-
lins, Russia’s Use of the ‘Energy Weapon’ in Europe, Issue Brief 
no. 07.18.17 (Houston: Rice University’s, Baker Institute for 
Public Policy, 2017). 
pass Ukraine and disengage in EU downstream mar-
kets, but also by the moves of the EU to promote diver-
sification and to not rely so heavily on Russia (see the 
section “Qualifying and Quantifying the Impact of 
the Crisis in and over Ukraine” on pp. 33ff.). Moreover, 
concerns are frequently raised that natural gas sup-
plies into Germany could be a means of “divide and 
rule” policies toward EU member states, undermine 
the EU Energy Union – not opportune in the given 
political situation of the severe security crisis over 
Ukraine – and also increase the vulnerability of 
Germany itself to Russian pressure.4 
We believe that, in the past, political and econom-
ic interests converged on both sides, even during the 
Cold War. This raises the question of how the crisis 
in and over Ukraine will play out between Germany 
and Russia vis-à-vis natural gas relations and whether 
political frictions will manifest. Larsson states in his 
often cited study that “Russia’s political reliability as 
an energy supplier depends on time perspective, the 
receiver and the context.”5 He concludes that “[p]re-
ceded by a severe political crisis, the risk for partial 
and/or short-duration cut-offs […] increases.”6 In order 
to get a better understanding about the substance and 
density of German-Russian gas relations, we take a 
long-term focus. 
Against the background of the dramatic political 
changes in 2014 concerning the crisis in and over 
Ukraine, it is timely and relevant to analyze the major 
drivers, motivations, and patterns of German-Russian 
gas relations. We focus on the main structures and 
 
4 See e.g.: “Estland warnt vor Folgen von Nord Stream 2. 
Außenminister kritisiert geplante Pipeline und wirbt für 
Verhandlungen der EU mit Moskau” [Estonia Warns about 
the Consequences of Nord Stream 2. The Foreign Minister 
Criticizes the Planned Pipeline and Touts for Negotiations 
between the EU and Moscow], Tagesspiegel, 18 July 2017; Rein-
hard Bütikofer, “Keine neue Pipeline in der Ostsee” [No New 
Pipeline in the Baltic Sea], Die Welt, 14 July 2017; Ilya Zaslav-
skyi, The Kremlin’s Gas Games in Europe: Implications for Policy 
Makers, Issue Brief May 2017 (Washington, D.C.: Atlantic 
Council Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center/Free Russia, 2017); 
Larsson, Russian Energy Policy (see note 3); Collins, Russia’s Use of 
the ‘Energy Weapon’ in Europe (see note 3), 6–7. 
5 Larsson, Russian Energy Policy (see note 3), 3. 
6 Ibid. 
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8 
actors, their patterns, and the interactions that com-
prise the web of these gas relations during different 
phases. The first phase is from the start of sending gas 
exports to Germany in the 1970s till Germany’s re-
unification and the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
in 1989/1991. The second phase is defined as starting 
with the new political environment following the fall 
of the Berlin wall through to the publication of the 
Third Energy Package of the EU, which fundamentally 
impacted EU natural gas markets (1990–2008). The 
beginning of the next phase is marked by the imple-
mentation of the Third Energy Package in 2009, the 
gas glut following the fracking revolution in the 
United States, and the German Energiewende. We argue 
that these three factors have shaken up the gas rela-
tionship. The crisis in and over Ukraine since 2014 
and the growing rift between Moscow and the West 
come on top of these other developments. For each 
of the three phases, which we look into in more detail, 
we analyze: 1) the development of infrastructure, 
2) trade, 3) business-to-business relations and commer-
cial issues, and 4) legal and regulatory issues. At the 
beginning of each phase, we start with a description 
of the political and institutional contexts. 
Conceptualization and Terminology 
As is shown in the following sections, natural gas re-
lations with Russia are often analyzed either through 
the prism of commercial and market-based trans-
actions or that of foreign policy and geopolitics.7 In 
many cases, Russian actions are associated primarily 
with geopolitics, whereas Germany and the EU are 
perceived as market actors.8 We do not share this 
assessment; our underlying assumption is that ele-
ments of both can be found on either side, and that it 
is necessary to closely analyze the substance, density, 
and patterns of German-Russian natural gas relations. 
Against this background, a clarification of the 
terminology is needed. We define a “geopolitical ap-
proach” as being when energy is subject to foreign 
and security policy considerations. Energy then is (in-
tended to be) used as a tool and means to influence 
political outcomes, achieve foreign policy goals, and 
as a lever to project power. We believe that the strong 
 
7 See for this argument: Tatiana Romanova, “Is Russian Energy 
Policy towards the EU Only about Geopolitics? The Case of the 
Third Liberalisation Package”, Geopolitics 21, no. 4 (2016): 857–
79. 
8 Ibid. 
connection often found between geopolitics and 
energy reveals an important fact: territory, geology, 
and geography are inherent to energy relations;9 gas 
production, trade, and the necessary infrastructure 
depend on location and geography. The integrated 
natural gas infrastructure constructed over the past 
decades can be viewed as an “infrastructured” geo-
graphy of “long durée” that has outlasted the Cold 
War, countries, and political systems, and that shapes 
spaces and even creates its own “ecology” and topog-
raphy.10 Shaping such a space has gone hand in hand 
with the creation of a political, legal, and economic 
space – in the case of the (former) Soviet Union – and 
an economic, legal, and contractual space with regard 
to the COMECON countries.11 
With respect to the projection of power, it is not 
easy to distinguish the use of a dominant market posi-
tion from geopolitics in those cases where economic 
and political interests converge. Hence, the analysis of 
energy policies may oscillate between “geo-economics” 
and geopolitics,12 as the boundaries between the two 
concepts are increasingly blurred. In a broader defini-
tion, “(g)eo-economics encompasses both the conver-
sion of economic assets into political influence and 
the mobilisation of political power to achieve economic 
goals through a mix of competition and cooperation.”13 
With respect to the different political and legal spaces 
emerging in Europe and Eurasia, this is closely con-
nected to the issue of who defines the rules of the “gas 
game” in the “infrastructured” space. 
 
9 See: Ellen Scholl and Kirsten Westphal, European Energy Secu-
rity Reimagined. Mapping the Risks, Challenges and Opportunities of 
Changing Energy Geographies, SWP Research Paper 4/2017 (Ber-
lin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2017). 
10 Högselius, Red Gas (see note 2), 234–35. 
11 See also” Katja Yafimava’s concept of four spaces: The Tran-
sit Dimension of EU Energy Security (Oxford: Oxford Institute for 
Energy Studies [OIES], and Oxford University Press, 2011). 
12 How diverse Russian gas policies are analyzed is exempli-
fied by two studies: Szymon Kardas, The Tug of War. Russia’s 
Response to Changes on the European Gas Market, OSW Studies 
(Warsaw: Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich [OSW; Centre for 
Eastern Studies], 11 September 2014), and Ralf Dickel, Elham 
Hassanzadeh, James Henderson, Anouk Honoré, Laura El-Katiri, 
Simon Pirani, Howard Rogers, Jonathan Stern, and Katja Yafi-
mava, Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas: Distinguish-
ing Natural Gas Security from Geopolitics, OIES Paper NG 92 (Ox-
ford: OIES, October 2014). 
13 Giovanni Grevi, “Geo-economics and Global Governance”, 
in Challenges for European Policy in 2012: What Kind of Geo-economic 
Europe?, ed. Ana Martiningui and Richard Youngs (Madrid: 
FRIDE, 2011), 27–36, in particular 28. 
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In a norm-based liberal market order, energy is pri-
marily treated as a commodity (or a service) that is 
traded on the basis of transparent rules, market prin-
ciples, and clearly defined institutions.14 Gas trade 
that follows commercial principles is driven by price 
signals and contractual relations and determined by 
infrastructure. Decisions are primarily taken by com-
panies to maintain and defend market share and 
maximize revenues. Governments act as transparent 
rule-providers and guarantors of a market framework 
and ensure a level playing field, whereas govern-
ments and state interests dominate energy trade with 
ad hoc and specific arrangements under a geopolitical 
approach.15 
A major concept guiding energy policy in Germany 
and the EU is energy security. Energy security is defined 
by the strategic energy triangle, which is composed of 
the three objectives to have secure, competitive, and 
sustainable energy supplies.16 Daniel Yergin’s defini-
tion of energy security – “adequate, reliable supplies 
of energy at reasonable prices in ways that do not jeop-
ardize major national values and objectives”17 – ex-
plains why energy security has moved to the forefront 
during the crisis over Ukraine. Whether energy deliv-
eries can be used as a political tool in times of political 
conflict and security crises has become a source of 
debate. This preoccupation corresponds with Larsson’s 
thesis that the risks of partial, short-term cuts increase 
during times of geopolitical crises.18 When energy 
deliveries from external suppliers are framed as a 
security threat or risk to independence and national 
sovereignty, energy is then beyond being an issue that 
is dealt with using established market mechanisms – 
this is because of the spillover effects of energy into 
other arenas.19 This “securitization” opens ways for 
dealing with energy supplies using other means.20 
 
14 Romanova, “Is Russian Energy Policy towards the EU 
Only about Geopolitics?” (see note 7), 858. 
15 Ibid., 859. 
16 Energy Strategy and Energy Union, https://ec.europa.eu/ 
energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and-energy-union. 
17 Daniel Yergin, “Energy Security in the 1990s”, Foreign 
Affairs 67, no. 1 (1988): 110–32 (111). 
18 Larsson, Russian Energy Policy (see note 3), 3. 
19 Odysseas Christou and Constantinos Adamides, “Energy 
Securitization and Desecuritization in the New Middle East”, 
Security Dialogue 44, nos. 5–6 (2013): 507–22. 
20 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 491; Holger Strizel, 
“Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and 
Beyond”, European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 3 
(2007): 357–83. 
The flip side of supply security is demand predict-
ability, from a supplier’s point of view. For Russia, 
energy security is based on “securing” Germany and 
the EU as a strategic and vital market. “Security of 
exports […] includes economic, political and social 
aspects of energy.”21 Gas export revenues have a socio-
economic value for Russia and contribute to the fed-
eral budget, the gross domestic product (GDP), and 
serve as an income source. This allows for the domes-
tic gas system to be developed and for internal sup-
plies to be delivered at subsidized – and later regu-
lated – prices. This is why national sovereignty over 
energy resources is a political paradigm. The political 
value stems from Russia’s role as a key energy supplier 
and contributes to its role as a strategic partner.22 For 
Russia – as for any other gas supplier that has to make 
long-term, financially intensive investments – long-
term price developments and commitments23 are 
essential to ensuring security of exports. We show that 
the delicate balance of energy security between the 
supplier (Russia) and the consumer (Germany) is off 
kilter. 
Setting the Scene: Gas As a Component in 
the Bilateral Relationship 
Economic Background 
Germany primarily exports mechanical engineering 
products, vehicles, electrical and electronic goods, 
and chemical products, whereas Russia exports raw 
materials, especially oil and gas, metal goods, and 
petrochemical products (see Figures 1 and 2, p. 10). 
According to the Committee on Eastern European 
Economic Relations (a lobbying group representing 
businesses), 300,000 German jobs depend on trade 
with Russia, 6,200 companies with German owners 
are active in Russia,24 and German companies have 
invested €15.8 billion there.25 In 2016, Russia ranked 
 
21 Jack D. Sharples, “Russian Approaches to Energy Security 
and Climate Change: Russian Gas Exports to the EU”, Environ-
mental Politics 22, no. 4 (2013): 683–700 (686). 
22 Ibid. 
23 Maria Belova, Interview 2011 in ibid., 685. 
24 “German Firms in Russia: Lovers, Not Fighters”, The 
Economist, 15 March 2014, https://www.economist.com/news/ 
business/21599034-german-exporters-are-pushing-back-
against-economic-sanctions-russia-lovers-not-fighters. 
25 http://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Content/DE/Trade/Fachdaten/ 
MKT/2016/11/mkt201611222008_159230_wirtschaftsdaten-
kompakt---russland.pdf?v=3. 
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Figure 1 
Structure of German exports to Russia  
in 2016 (SITC), €21.6 bn. 
Source: Destatis. 
Figure 2 
Structure of German imports from Russia  
in 2016 (SITC), €26.4 bn. 
Source: Destatis. 
Figure 3 
Russian gas exports – Gazprom Group’s sales of natural 
gas to world in 2016*, 261.5 bcm 
* without Russia. 
Source: Gazprom. 
Figure 4 
German gas imports in 2016, 121.8 bcm 
Source: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWI), 
Energiedaten: Gesamtausgabe [Energy Data: Complete Edition] 
(Berlin, October 2017), 31, http://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/ 
Downloads/Energiedaten/energiedaten-gesamt-pdf-grafiken. 
pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=22. 
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Figure 5 
German gas imports from USSR/Russia 1970–2017* 
* Estimates. 
Source: International Energy Agency; since 1999 Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle. 
 
as Germany’s 16th-largest trading partner in foreign 
trade (exports).26 Apart from EU member states, Russia 
was Germany’s third-largest trading partner in 2016, 
after the United States and China, with significantly 
lower volumes, though.27 
Energy represents a major factor in this relation-
ship (see Figure 2). Russia and Germany enjoy deep 
interaction and cooperation with each other in this 
area – the Russian Federation remains Germany’s 
leading energy supplier, while Germany is one of the 
main export markets, trading partners, and investors 
for Russia. For Russia, Germany is the single-largest 
export market, representing 22.1 percent of total gas 
exports from Russia in 2016 (see Figure 3). With gas 
supplies to the Former Soviet Union diminishing and 
gas sales on the Russian market shrinking, Germany 
has become the major destination for Russian gas and 
a key market for Gazprom. Almost 35 percent of Ger-
many’s gas imports came from Russia (see Figure 4). 
Germany is the biggest importer of Russian gas in the 
 
26 Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis), Außenhandel: Reihenfolge 
der Handelspartner im Außenhandel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
[External Trade: Ranking of Trade Partners in External Trade 
of German Federal Republic] (Berlin, 24 October 2017), 2, 
https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/Gesamtwirtschaft 
Umwelt/Aussenhandel/Tabellen/RangfolgeHandelspartner.pdf
?__blob=publicationFile. 
27 http://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Content/DE/Trade/Fachdaten/ 
MKT/2016/11/mkt201611222008_159230_wirtschaftsdaten-
kompakt---russland.pdf?v=3 (page 5). 
EU in total volume, but in relative terms it maintains 
a diversified import portfolio. The gas trade developed 
over time as volumes increased steadily (see Figure 5). 
According to the Federal Ministry for Economic 
Affairs and Energy (BMWi) and AG Energiebilanzen 
e.V., natural gas represented 22.6 percent of Germa-
ny’s primary energy consumption in 2016.28 Approx-
imately 90 percent of the consumed gas is imported 
through pipelines. A major consumer inside Germany 
is industry –accounting for almost 35 percent of over-
all consumption. The tertiary sector accounts for 
around 28 percent, and consumption in the transport 
sector is negligible. The biggest share of gas consump-
tion is private households, with almost 37 percent,29 
as natural gas provides around 50 percent of fuel for 
all heating systems in Germany. This is an important 
factor, as natural gas is a major energy source for pro-
tected customers (e.g., private households), thus imply-
ing a special responsibility of the government. Hence, 
according to the German Law on Energy Industry (Ener-
giewirtschaftsgesetz), supply security is primarily the task 
of private companies, but the government has a spe-
cial role in case of emergencies. This legal background 
is important for the following discussion on the devel-
opment of the German-Russian gas relationship. 
 
28 Arbeitsgemeinschaft Energiebilanzen (AGEB), Energiever-
brauch 2016 [Energy Consumption 2016], Pressedienst 1 (2017), 4. 
29 AGEB, Auswertungstabellen zur Energiebilanz Deutschland  
1990–2015 [Evaluation Tables on Energy Balance in Germany 
1990-2015] (Berlin and Cologne, July 2016), 18–20. 
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Development of the Gas Relationship 
between the USSR and the Federal Republic 
of Germany till the 1990s 
Political Background 
The Erdgas-Röhren-Geschäft (gas-for-pipes deal) became 
part of a New Eastern Policy of Federal Republic of 
Germany,30 initiated by Willy Brandt and his close 
advisor, Egon Bahr. Foreign Minister Brandt identified 
the economy as being the main instrument in the 
Eastern policy. Natural gas imports – in combination 
with large-scale exports of German steel and pipes – 
were seen as being a unique opportunity for concrete 
cooperation projects.31 A Social Democrat, Willy 
Brandt was elected Chancellor in 1969. He launched 
the Ostpolitik, which led to the abandonment of the 
Hallstein Doctrine32 and to questions concerning the 
unity of the German nation. In the context of rap-
prochement between the FRG and the German Demo-
cratic Republic (GDR), German businesspeople again 
took up the issue of gas imports from the Soviet 
Union, an issue that had been first articulated by 
Bavaria to reduce dependence on coal from northern 
Germany.33 An Austrian-Soviet gas deal was signed in 
1968. The Soviet leadership was extremely interested 
in the monetization of its vast gas resources recently 
discovered and in expanding the flow of hard cur-
 
30 This section primarily focuses on the development of West 
Germany’s gas relations with Russia, because the market 
structures of East Germany – the German Democratic Repub-
lic – were quickly adapted and harmonized after unification. 
31 Högselius, Red Gas (see note 2), 106–7. 
32 The doctrine is based on the concept of “Alleinvertretungs-
anspruch” (exclusive mandate). The doctrine had a key role 
in the foreign policy of the FRG after 1955. It prohibited 
the establishment of diplomatic relations with the GDR and 
with all states that had recognized the latter – the traditional 
policy of the Christian Democrats of the CDU. 
33 Inside Germany, the state of Bavaria lost its “leading role” 
as the initiator of German-Russian gas ties to the large North 
Rhine-Westphalian industrial giants of Ruhrgas, Mannes-
mann, and Thyssen. Even though Bayerngas did not become 
part of the deal, the arrangement found the support of then-
Minister President of Bavaria, Franz Josef Strauss, who 
was looking into economic cooperation with the GDR. See: 
Högselius, Red Gas (see note 2), 67–88. 
rency, which was needed to sustain the country’s 
economy, which had started to suffer from the rigidity 
of the administrative system and unsustainable spend-
ing on the arms race. The gas-for-pipes deal34 linked 
together the Deutsche Bank, Ruhrgas, and Soyuzgas-
export – Gazprom’s forerunner. In order to resolve the 
issues related to the US ban on large-diameter steel 
pipe exports from West Germany to the Soviet Union, 
Foreign Minister Andrey Gromiko offered a new model 
of economic cooperation with West Germany in 1969. 
Germany had historically been the main supplier of 
equipment and technologies since the 1930s. There-
fore, Germany was always regarded as a key partner in 
Europe, and the gas-for-pipes deal reinforced this per-
ception. Gromiko’s concept foresaw pipes and other 
equipment being imported in exchange for gas exports. 
Despite American opposition, the German economic 
affairs minister, Karl Schiller, and his Soviet counter-
part, Nikolai S. Patolichev, signed a contract in 1970. 
Such a contract was a strong incentive for other Euro-
pean Community member states to sign supply agree-
ments with the USSR in order to establish connections 
with German infrastructure suppliers35 and to diversify 
gas imports in order to be less dependent on Dutch gas. 
Developing Infrastructure and Trade 
The 1970s saw the development of a flourishing busi-
ness. The first gas supplies from the USSR to West 
Germany began in October 1973, with the company 
Ruhrgas serving as the buyer. Earlier that year, on May 
1, natural gas supplies started getting shipped from 
the USSR to East Germany, according to the inter-
governmental agreement signed in 1968.36 
 
34 Susanne Nies, Gaz et pétrole vers l’Europe, perspectives pour 
les infrastructures [Gas and Oil for Europe, Prospects for Infra-
structure] (Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internatio-
nales [IFRI], 2008). 
35 Susanne Nies, An Overview of Existing and Planned Infrastruc-
tures [Gas and Oil in Europe, Prospects for the Infrastructure], 
New Edition (Paris: IFRI, 2011). 
36 Aurélie Bros, PhD thesis, Good Bye Ukraine! How Does Gaz-
prom Aim to Ensure the Security of Demand in a Context Where 
Europe Is Reshaping Its Energy Architecture?, October 2014. 
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Figure 6 
Development of natural gas imports from USSR 1970–1991* 
* To West Germany till reunification. Supplies to the GDR made up 3.2 bcm in 1974 and 6.2 bcm in 1985 (Joachim Kahlert, Die 
Kernenergiepolitik in der DDR. Zur Geschichte uneingelöster Fortschrittshoffnungen [Nuclear Energy Policy in the GDR. On the History of 
Unredeemed Hopes of Progress] [Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1988], 39). 
Source: International Energy Agency. 
 
In the decade after 1973, deliveries of Soviet gas to 
West Germany increased from 1.1 billion cubic meters 
(bcm) to more than 15 bcm (see Figure 6). In exchange, 
the USSR received 1.2 million tons of piping manu-
factured by Mannesmann and a loan of 1.2 billion 
Deutsche Marks. This agreement was advantageous to 
both sides – the USSR received Western currency and 
technology, and West Germany benefited from gas 
prices lower than those of the Netherlands as well 
as from the expanding market for German pipe pro-
ducers and steelmakers. 
Scientific technological cooperation on gas issues 
was developed, too – the help of German experts was 
necessary for the development of the biggest Soviet 
projects on gas extraction and transport. In 1974 an 
“Orenburgskoye agreement” was signed; engineers 
and constructors were to participate in the develop-
ment of Orenburgskoye field and in the construction 
of the gas pipeline “Orenburg-Western border of the 
USSR,” later renamed “Soyuz.” From 1985 to 1987, a 
similar agreement, the “Yamburgskoye agreement,” 
was signed to develop the Yamburgskoye field. Until 
1989 the Verbundnetz Gas Company was receiving 
Russian gas in exchange for the construction of units 
and the supply of equipment and pipes from East 
Germany – used for the construction of the gas pipe-
line “Yamburg–Western border of the USSR,” among 
other projects.37 
Transport projects were at the heart of the coopera-
tion; massive infrastructure construction formed the 
major part of the gas-for-pipes deal in order to bring 
hydrocarbons from Western Siberia to Western Europe. 
The pipeline from Urengoy-Pomary to Uzhgorod/Velke 
Kapusani, which has been at the heart of pipeline 
politics since the crisis in and over Ukraine, was built 
against strong US opposition. The outcome was an 
“infrastructured” energy space shaping the energy 
geography and creating fixed and long-standing inter-
dependencies through an integrated gas system. In 
both blocs – in COMECON and in the European Com-
munity – gas trade promoted integration. This is why 
it can be argued that the deals drove development and 
integration of the gas systems in the two blocs as well 
as across them.38 In Europe, the gas markets became 
increasingly interconnected between Germany and 
France and also Germany and Austria as well as with 
Italy. Complementarity was created through the fact 
that the Soviet Union aimed to further develop its 
 
37 “40 Years in the German Market”, Gazprom, 10 October 
2013, http://www.gazprom.ru/about/history/events/germany40/. 
38 See for an excellent analysis: Högselius, Red Gas 
(see note 2). 
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hydrocarbon sector and energy infrastructure. For the 
then Soviet Union, the exports were key for the devel-
opment of the natural gas industry. 
In parallel to gas-import deals, Germany gradually 
built up large underground storage facilities. The first 
was built in 1955, but a significant increase followed 
the gas-for-pipes deal with the Soviet Union as part 
of an energy security strategy and insurance against 
supply shortages. Storage facilities were filled in sum-
mer and used in winter, when the Soviet Union itself 
experienced a higher demand in gas. By 1990 the total 
capacity was at 8 bcm of working gas.39 Underground 
storage facilities were part of the insurance policy pur-
sued by Germany (as well as the other West European 
importers). 
Commercial Relations 
The first receiver of gas was the East German company 
Verbundnetz Gas. Partners on the USSR side were en-
terprises belonging to the Ministry of Construction of 
Facilities in the Gas Industry of the USSR (Soyuzinter-
gazstroi) and the Soviet Agency for Gas Exports (Soyuz-
gasexport). The Ministry of Gas Industry (Mingazprom) 
– the predecessor of OAO (open shareholding com-
pany) Gazprom – did not have the right to lead any 
export activities. Ruhrgas became the importer in 
West Germany. 
In fact, the gas relations that were initiated in the 
early 1960s were comprised of much more than mere 
trade interactions.40 They resulted in a close relation-
ship between an exporter and an importer starting 
from complementary positions. Long-term contractual 
arrangements were the result. The institutional set-
ting “bridged” and connected two markets with differ-
ing internal market structures – a centrally planned 
economy with a regionally monopolized gas market. 
The contractual relationship was designed for the 
long-term and based on a bilateral political and com-
mercial consensus. 
Besides complementary economic structures and 
interests as well as the integrated gas infrastructure, 
the cooperation between the Soviet Union/Russia and 
West Europe built upon matching market structures 
 
39 “Untertage-Gasspeicherung in Deutschland” [Under-
ground Storage of Natural Gas in Germany], Erdöl, Erdgas, Kohle 
130, no. 11 (2014): 402–12 (405). No authors indicated by 
the source is Landesamt für Bergbau, Energie und Geologie 
(LBEG). 
40 See in all detail: Högselius, Red Gas (see note 2). 
and corresponding business models.41 The market 
structures matched perfectly: An importing company 
received gas at the border from a producing company. 
Ruhrgas was West Germany’s preeminent importing 
and transmission company. Last but not least, the busi-
ness models of both sides were based on long-term, oil-
indexed delivery contracts, with terms of 20, 25, or 30 
years, including a minimum take-or-pay obligation to 
purchase at least 75 to 85 percent of the named quan-
tity. These obligations represented a counterweight 
to the supplier’s duty to maintain the necessary level 
of production.42 In that sense, the business model al-
lowed the two parties to balance the price and volume 
risks: The producer bore the price risk, whereas the im-
porter bore the risk of failing to sell the full quantity 
of the contracted gas. The contracts included provi-
sions for adjusting prices to changing market condi-
tions at regular intervals. “Demarcation” at the border 
was clear; gas was delivered to the “flange” at the 
border. 
The netback principle was adopted in Western 
Europe.43 This enabled the Soviet Union to generate 
maximum revenues over the long term. This netback 
principle made natural gas competitive enough to 
capture market share from other fuels, as the formula 
allowed for prices that were slightly below those of 
competing fuels (e.g., fuel oil for heating) in the desti-
nation market. With COMECON, gas trade was part 
of the coordinated central planning process and based 
on the cost-plus principle.44 
Summing Up the First Phase 
To summarize, throughout the Cold War, political 
and economic interests converged on both sides. As 
described above, political support was a given, as the 
 
41 Kirsten Westphal, “Institutional Change in European 
Natural Gas Markets and Implications for Energy Security: 
Lessons from the German Case”, Energy Policy 74 (2014): 35–43. 
42 Putting a Price on Energy, International Pricing Mechanisms 
for Oil and Gas (Brussels: Energy Charter Secretariat, 2007), 
143–73, in particular 146–63.  
43 The cost-plus principle implies a pricing method in which 
the prices are generated by the costs for production, process-
ing, and transmission, etc., plus certain profits to be generated. 
Netback prices are defined at the destination minus the costs 
for transport, etc. 
44 This is why we do not go into detail here on the GDR, 
because the West German gas market served as a model, 
and the dynamics in the German gas market fundamentally 
changed in the 1990s (see next section). 
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deals were part and parcel of the Ostpolitik, rapproche-
ment, and détente. West Germany looked for diversi-
fication. For the Soviet Union, West Germany was a 
vehicle to develop its own gas reserves and transport 
system and to integrate the Soviet and COMECON 
spaces. This is an example of geopolitical motivation 
and less about the bilateral relationship, which was 
based on pragmatism with win-win logic for both 
sides. The market and contract structures, as well as 
the business model, were designed to serve both ends 
of the pipeline and provided the basis for long-term, 
stable relations. Gas trade volumes grew over time, 
and an integrated natural gas infrastructure was 
created. At the same time, the gas companies devel-
oped close personal ties between them. Gas was sup-
plied and contract obligations were fulfilled, which 
created the narrative of Russia’s reliability as a gas 
supplier in Germany across all parties. 
The Next Phase (1990–2009): Joint Ventures and 
Package Deals along the Whole Value Chain 
Political Background 
The phase between 1989 and 2009 is marked by Ger-
man reunification and the integration of the East 
German gas market into the northwestern European 
gas market as well as by the adoption of the Third 
Energy Package in 2009. 
The deep belief in interdependence and the funda-
mental experience of rapprochement, mutual trust, 
and confidence-building that characterized this phase 
also had their roots in the reunification of Germany. 
The key role of Moscow is deeply built into the history 
of unified Germany. This resulted in the proclamation 
of a strategic partnership in the early 1990s. The idea(l) 
of rapprochement through interdependence drove 
political decision-making in the 1990s and the first 
half of the 2000s: A whole set of institutions and fora 
were created on the bilateral level to support natural 
gas relations. The idea – echoed by Germany – was to 
overcome existing divisions and create an overarching 
energy market from Lisbon to Vladivostok.45 
The political hope in Germany with regard to inter-
dependence was for Russia to gradually adopt Euro-
pean norms and values (e.g., in the Partnership and 
 
45 This idea is reflected in the European Energy Charter of 
1991 and the European Energy Charter Treaty of 1994. See: 
http://www.energycharter.org/process/overview/. 
Cooperation Agreement of the EU with Russia that 
came into force in 1997 and the “four common 
spaces” of the St. Petersburg Summit in 2003). This 
hope was also nourished by ongoing general market 
reforms in Russia; these, however, did not extend to 
the gas sector, which remained monopolized till the 
early 2000s. 
Moreover, the trajectories drifted further apart. 
What became ever more visible was a very distinct 
understanding of interdependence.46 Whereas Ger-
many and its EU partners had perceived regime-
building to be the basis for economic cooperation to 
minimize transaction costs and create level playing 
fields, Russia increasingly resisted supporting this 
rule- and norm-based understanding of interdepend-
ence. Moreover, national sovereignty over natural 
resources remained paramount in Russia, given its 
role for the Russian economy and the Russian budget. 
Starting in the 2000s, the energy relationship in-
volved initiatives for a deepening and diversification 
of activities – energy efficiency, for example. In 2004, 
Russia and Germany agreed to expand economic ties 
and enhance cooperation in the energy field. In the 
2000s the “New Ostpolitik” culminated in a Moderniza-
tion Partnership in 2008, which aimed an intensifi-
cation of cooperation in law, health policy, demogra-
phy,47 and also energy efficiency, among other things, 
by 2008. In 2007, the Russian-German Chamber of 
Commerce was established. In July 2009 Russia and 
Germany concluded an agreement on scientific and 
technical cooperation and signed a Joint Declaration 
of the Energy Minister of Russian Federation and the 
Federal Minister of Economics and Technology of Ger-
many, which encompassed practically all spheres of 
cooperation in the energy sector. A number of initia-
tives were designed to fill the modernization concept 
with substance: In March 2008 a Subgroup on Energy 
Savings was created. One pilot project of the sub-
group’s activities was the conception of energy-effi-
ciency improvement, developed for the city of Ekate-
 
46 See: Alexander Libman, Susan Stewart, and Kirsten West-
phal, “Mit Unterschieden umgehen: Die Rolle von Inter-
dependenz in der Beziehung zu Russland” [Dealing with Dif-
ferences: The Role of Interdependency in Relations with 
Russia], in Ausblick 2016: Begriffe und Realitäten internationaler 
Politik, ed. Volker Perthes (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, January 2016), 18–22. 
47 See also: Susan Stewart, Prämissen hinterfragen. Plädoyer 
für eine Neugestaltung der deutschen Russlandpolitik [Questioning 
Premises. A Plea for the Reshaping of German Russia-Policy], 
SWP-Aktuell 50/2012 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, August 2012). 
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rinburg (with participation of Siemens SE). Moreover, 
at the eighth session of the “Petersburg Dialogue” in 
September–October 2008, Russia and Germany ini-
tiated the establishment of the Russian-German Ener-
gy Agency (RUDEA), which began operations in the 
summer of 2009. Yet, these initiatives did not deliver 
the hoped-for results and created some disappoint-
ment, especially in the 2010s. RUDEA, which was 
perceived in Germany to be an opportunity to defend 
its know-how in the sector of energy savings while 
opening up the possibility of exporting its production 
to Russia, was dissolved in February 2013. 
To sum up, energy (including natural gas) became 
part of the dialogue mechanisms between Germany 
and Russia, mechanisms that expanded and deepened 
after the end of the Soviet Union. They were formal-
ized at the bilateral level, including the political 
sphere, the economy, and civil society, with the goal 
of gradual but linear rapprochement. Concurrent 
with the bilateral dialogue, the EU Commission 
launched the EU-Russia dialogue when the president 
of the EU Commission, Romano Prodi, announced 
plans to double imports from Russia.48 Indeed, as will 
be shown, the enlarged EU emerged as a major inter-
vening factor. 
Expansion of Infrastructure and Trade 
During this phase, Russia’s traditional approach to-
ward an integrated natural gas system was advanced 
with a direct link to the biggest continental market. 
Given the dependency of Russian companies on long-
distance transport to generate revenues, the control 
of infrastructure was (and remains) paramount. 
In the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the 
collapse of the Soviet system, and COMECON, the 
most tangible change was the emergence of “inde-
pendent” transit countries. Moreover, the number of 
bilateral agreements in the gas business increased 
 
48 Prodi plan, September 2000, according to which gas im-
ports from Russia would be doubled by 2020. “This [project] 
corresponds to the interests of both the EU and Russia.”  
“For the EU it is a question of diversifying its long-term 
energy sources” (Jacques Chirac). 
“We have been involved in energy discussions in the frame-
work of our strategic partnership.”  
“It will be necessary to mobilize big economic resources for 
possible investment projects in Russia” (Romano Prodi); see: 
http://old.themoscowtimes.com/sitemap/free/2000/10/article/ 
putins-paris-talks-focus-on-gas-war/257737.html/. 
between 1990 and the early 2000s. Russian-German 
gas trade developed accordingly (see Figure 7). 
A major development was the expansion of gas 
transport infrastructure in the 1990s to and within 
Germany. Gazprom’s desire to bypass Ukrainian 
territory grew over time.49 
The Yamal pipeline was finalized in 1999 and 
started running at full capacity around 2006. It con-
nects the Urengoy gas field in Western Siberia with 
Germany and crosses Belarus and Poland (see map 1, 
p. 28). It was the first major project built for the pur-
pose of circumventing Ukraine. Inside Russia, the 
pipeline Northern Lights was built. 
The next step to diversify was the gas pipeline 
through the Baltic Sea, which was first discussed in 
the late 1990s. In 2005, the Nord Stream 1 pipeline 
agreement was signed, with both President Putin and 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of Germany present. 
Initially, this project was called the North European 
Gas Pipeline and was planned to run through Finland 
and Sweden. Nord Stream 1 runs through the Baltic 
Sea: from Vyborg, Russia, to Lubmin, which is near 
Greifswald, Germany. With the argument that the 
project strengthens the EU energy market and rein-
forces security of supply, it was included in the Trans-
European Network for Energy50 guidelines before be-
ing designated as a project of “European interest” 
by the European Parliament and the Council in 2006. 
The German companies Wintershall and E.ON Ruhr-
gas were initially the only European shareholders, 
holding 24.5 percent each. Later, Nord Stream AG, 
which built and operates the pipelines, was joined 
by N.V. Nederlands Gasunie and the French company 
GDF (now Engie). The two 1,224-kilometer offshore 
pipelines, with a total capacity of 55 bcm annually, 
form a direct connection between Russia’s vast gas 
reserves and its biggest gas client, Germany, without 
transiting through a third country.51 
 
49 Ukraine is an example of a combination of energy policy 
and geopolitics. The aim to diversify resulted on the one hand 
from the obsolescent state of the Ukrainian gas network and 
its poor maintenance. On the other hand, bilateral nego-
tiations about gas deliveries, transit volumes, and gas prices 
became intertwined with political issues such as the Black 
Sea fleet, nuclear weapons, etc., resulting in opaque political 
and economic package deals. 
50 European Commission, Trans-European Energy Networks, TEN-
E Priority Projects (Brussels: European Commission, DG Energy 
and Transport, 2004), 26. 
51 The route crosses the Exclusive Economic Zones of Russia, 
Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Germany, as well as the terri-
torial waters of Russia, Denmark, and Germany. 
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Figure 7 
German gas imports from USSR/Russia 1990–2009 
Source: International Energy Agency; since 1999 Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle 
 
Because of the publicity of signing the agreement with 
President Putin and Chancellor Schröder present, as 
well as the pivotal roles of BASF Wintershall and E.ON, 
the project became a symbol of German-Russian gas 
relationship, which came under increased criticism 
from other EU member states. Primarily Poland and 
the Baltic states lamented the very specific German-
Russian nature of the project and the bypassing of EU 
member states.52 These reactions reflect the old East-
West divide53 and uneven geographies of vulnerability. 
The pipeline isolated countries south of the Baltic Sea, 
which are highly dependent on Russian gas imports. 
The heightened sensitivity of energy security in the EU 
is a consequence of EU eastern enlargement in 2004, 
but also of the Russian-Ukrainian transit crisis in 2006. 
Originally, Nord Stream 1 was to connect the Shtok-
man field in the Barents Sea via pipelines to the EU 
market. Shtokman’s exploration, however, was post-
poned due to oversupply resulting from the shale gas 
revolution in the United States. 
 
52 Poland’s then-foreign minister went so far as to compare 
it to the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (“Eastern Europe to 
Confront Berlin over New Russian Gas Pipeline”, Financial 
Times, 29 October 2015, https://www.ft.com/content/eb1ebca8-
9514-11e5-ac15-0f7f7945adba [accessed 24 July 2017]). 
53 Aurélie Bros, There Will Be Gas: Gazprom’s Transport Strategy 
in Europe, Russie Nei Report no. 21 (Paris: IFRI, October 2015), 
https://www.ifri.org/fr/publications/enotes/russieneireports/ 
there-will-be-gas-gazproms-transport-strategy-europe. 
Commercial Relations: 
Mutual Interdependence and Package Deals 
The First Gas Market Transformation in Germany 
Before turning to bilateral commercial relations, it is 
necessary to examine the German gas market because 
its structures provide a very special case within the 
EU.54 The German gas market was characterized by a 
three-tier structure, with six big producing and five 
importing companies at the first level (which sold gas 
to 10 regional transmission companies – second tier), 
which in turn transported and sold gas to around 
700 regional and municipal distribution companies.55 
In contrast to other national gas markets in the EU, 
where one state-owned monopoly/company dominated, 
the German gas market structure was formed by dif-
ferent private companies with cross-ownership and 
some municipal shareholders. The dominant players 
were the importing companies – with Ruhrgas being 
the most genuine German player – but all were inter-
connected through ownership and gas sales contracts.56 
The vertically integrated business models of the com-
panies relied on regional horizontal demarcation and 
gas grids. 
 
54 See Heiko Lohmann, The German Path to Natural Gas Liberali-
sation: Is It a Special Case?, NG 14/2016 (Oxford: OIES, 2006). 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid., 14. 
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The Russian gas industry was formed under the roof 
of “Gazprom” in 1992, and Gazprom Export – the fully 
owned subsidiary of Gazprom – became the monopoly 
for gas exports from Russia. 
Before the start of the liberalization process in 
Europe, Gazprom was only enabled to sell gas to de-
dicated consumers on the wholesale market at the 
“flange” at the border. From a commercial point of 
view, gas trade remained a bilateral enterprise, insofar 
as gas trade bound Gazprom Export and German com-
panies. Both remained contractually linked for a rela-
tively long period. The long-term oil-indexed contracts 
allowed them to share the risks among the partners 
through the whole value chain. Gazprom bore the 
price risk and German importing companies the risk 
of volumes, because they agreed to take or pay a fixed 
amount of gas under these contracts – gas that they 
were to resell to their customers inside Germany. 
These predictable, long-term price developments and 
commitments57 were essential to ensuring the security 
of exports, as Russia – as with any other gas supplier – 
has to make long-term financial investments. For Ger-
many, these contracts secured defined supplies. 
A key asset for the territorial demarcations and 
regional monopolies inside Germany was control 
over (access to) pipelines, as natural gas is largely grid-
bound. Consequently, in the 1990s, Gazprom and 
Wintershall started to build their own gas network in 
order to compete with Ruhrgas’s network, bypass its 
monopoly, and provide large German companies with 
cheap gas. The MIDAL–RHG–STEGAL–JAGAL–WEDAL 
pipeline network offered Gazprom direct access to the 
German gas market. The Yamal pipeline hooked into 
the gas network. 
By building their own gas network (see map 1, 
p. 28), Gazprom and Wintershall not only managed 
to boost gas transmission capacities in Germany, but 
Gazprom was also able to start selling gas to Wingas, 
in addition to Ruhrgas. From a Russian perspective, 
this was a means of diversifying purchasers while 
gaining direct access to the German gas market. For 
Gazprom, it was also an opportunity to gain a better 
understanding of downstream costs, and therefore put 
an end to the asymmetry of information during nego-
tiations with the incumbent, Ruhrgas. 
Moreover, “direct” competition between Russian 
and Norwegian gas was the consequence. Gazprom 
 
57 Maria Belova, Interview 2011 in Sharples, “Russian 
Approaches to Energy Security and Climate Change” 
(see note 21), 685. 
and Wintershall challenged the regional monopoly 
of Ruhrgas and successfully introduced more compe-
tition prior to the adoption of the 1998 EU Directive 
on common rules in an internal gas market,58 the 
exact purpose of which was to put an end to incum-
bents. 
As a consequence, Wingas, the joint venture of 
Gazprom and BASF Wintershall, was the only excep-
tion in the 1990s and was not part of the “family 
clusters” of the gas industry. However, the aggressive 
competitor repeated the vertically integrated business 
model, and in doing so it became part of the club.59 
The oligopolistic structure of external supplies from 
the Netherlands, Russia, and Norway complemented 
the picture. Given the perceived plurality of gas en-
deavors in Germany, there was reluctance in Germany 
to liberalize the market, both in the government as 
well as the industry. Consequently, Germany was 
the only “old” EU member state to opt for negotiated 
third-party access to pipelines (instead of regulated 
access) under the first gas market directive of 1998,60 
and the last to establish a national regulator. 
Russia’s Strategy – Interdependence and Package Deals 
Gazprom Germania GmbH was created in 1990. Based 
in Berlin, it is a 100 percent subsidiary of Gazprom 
Export, which, over time, has acquired shares in dif-
ferent companies and joint ventures and created sub-
sidiaries such as Gazprom Marketing and Trading Ltd., 
based in London, in 1999. As described above, for the 
German market, the closer a company comes to the 
final consumer, the greater its profitability. 
Despite Gazprom’s outspoken criticism of the EU’s 
regulation of gas markets starting in 1998, Gazprom 
also benefited from the liberalization of the European 
energy market, because national markets were 
opened.61 Gazprom even functioned as a frontrunner 
with Wintershall in challenging the incumbent in 
Germany – Ruhrgas – in the 1990s. The penetration of 
the European gas value chain has been achieved 
 
58 “Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 22 June 1998 Concerning Common Rules for 
the Internal Market in Natural Gas”, Official Journal L 204, 21 
July 1998, 0001–0012. 
59 See Lohmann, The German Path to Natural Gas Liberalisation 
(see note 54), 17. 
60 Ibid., 25ff. 
61 Aurélie Bros, Gazprom in Europe: A Business Doomed to Fail?, 
Russie Nei Report N°18 (Paris: IFRI, July 2014), https://www. 
ifri.org/fr/publications/enotes/russieneireports/gazprom-
europe-business-doomed-fail. 
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through acquisitions of existing assets and the 
creation of subsidiaries, which have allowed the 
company to gain as much access as possible to end-
consumers and to be active in distribution, transport, 
and storage activities, as described below. The 
company has also embarked on marketing activities 
and the trading of gas through the development of 
regional and national trading hubs, which offer 
utilities the possibility to place gas on the market 
outside the long-term contract framework, should the 
need arise.62 Last but not least, the Russian company 
has tried (with limited success) to develop niches in 
markets, such as the use of gas in the transport sector 
– a step that would curb greenhouse gas emissions in 
one of the major emitting sectors in the EU. 
The business model of ever closer alliances along 
the entire transnational natural gas value chain and 
in bilateral monopolies was viewed as a materializa-
tion of the concept of mutual interdependence. Gaz-
prom’s acquisitions in Germany took place through 
quid pro quos and package deals, which covered large 
infrastructure projects as well as asset swaps. While 
Gazprom received access to mid- and downstream 
activities in Germany (that is transporting, trading, 
and marketing, mainly to business customers), Ger-
man companies gained access to the Russian upstream 
sector (exploration and production). This fueled the 
hope of a certain reciprocity in liberalization, even 
though the asymmetry in the relationship was already 
evident: although Russia and Gazprom could offer 
a series of production licenses, BASF’s shares in the 
(joint) subsidiaries were limited, putting an automatic 
end to the quid pro quo deals. 
These projects were realized on the territories of 
both Germany and Russia, in particular by the fol-
lowing companies: RAO “Gazprom,” E.ON, BASF SE, 
Wintershall Holding SE, Wingas GmbH, and VNG SE 
(see boxes 1–3, pp. 20f.). 
Summing Up the Second Phase 
Between 1980 and 1991 and then from 1991 to the 
early 2000s, the expansion of gas relations in both 
directions and the permeation of borders through 
joint activities were driven by commercial interests, 
which corresponded with the political interest in a 
close energy partnership. The expansion of the infra-
structure and the gas grid were again part and parcel 
 
62 Ibid. 
of the bilateral relationship. Yet, the relations became 
more commercial-based and business-driven than 
in the past. A new model of mutual interdependence 
emerged, and a series of German-Russian joint ven-
tures were created along the whole value chain. Aside 
from supplies of Russian gas to Germany and German 
equipment to Russia, active cooperation of Russian 
and German companies began to expand along the 
whole value chain and included projects on joint gas 
extraction, transport, sales, processing, deposits, and 
storage. The liberalization that fundamentally trans-
formed the German gas sector was also mirrored in 
Russia through the opening of Russian production 
to foreign companies, which opened up new areas for 
cooperation. This phase was dominated by a “market-
approach.” 
At that time, members of the German government, 
primarily Chancellor Schröder, built their policies on 
the premise that the security of Europe – not only in 
the energy field – could only be ensured by working 
with Russia. For the period up till 2009, the dominant 
impression on the German side was as follows: A stra-
tegic partnership in the long-term could be one of the 
best forms of cooperation for these two countries, and 
it could be achieved while facilitating the emergence 
of a market economy in Russia. For Russia, the eco-
nomic aspect was the most important part of the rela-
tionship. During this period, Germany was identified 
as the strongest supporter of Russia in Europe, and 
this was backed by strong personal ties. 
The political energy dialogue that emerged over 
this period constantly oscillated between bilateralism 
(Germany-Russia) and multilateral frameworks (EU-
Russia). The commercially driven gas trade relations 
were supported by political initiatives founded on the 
big hope of building a common gas market from Lis-
bon to Vladivostok, as mirrored in the Energy Charter 
Process, for example. These multilateral governance 
initiatives encompass the space of the integrated gas 
network. As described below, however, the impetus 
for such an overarching regime faded after EU enlarge-
ment to the east and the reaching out to the European 
neighborhood (Russia was not a part of it, but was of-
fered a special initiative of the “four common spaces”). 
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Box 1: Wintershall and Gazprom 
  
In 1990, business relations began between Gazprom 
and Wintershall, a 100 percent subsidiary of BASFa 
that had been operating in the oil and natural gas 
sectors for more than 80 years. The two companies 
set up the Wintershall Erdgas Handelshaus (WIEH) 
joint venture in November, which was responsible 
for selling, transporting, and storing natural gas in 
Europe. BASF had a dominant position in Germany, 
and BASF wanted to become more independent 
from its supplier, Ruhrgas, and negotiate purchases 
directly with the Russian company without inter-
ference from any other energy companies. In 
November 1991, both Gazprom and Wintershall 
agreed on gas deliveries (5.9 bcm) to the eastern 
part of the recently united Germany. In 1993, 
Wintershall Holding AG and Gazprom came to an 
agreement and established Wingas GmbH, which 
had the responsibility of marketing natural gas in 
Germany. At a later stage, the joint ventures WIEH, 
WIEE (Wintershall Erdgas Handelshaus Zug AG), 
and Wingas also started selling natural gas in the 
European market; cooperation began in the gas 
transmission and storage sectors. BASF managed 
to introduce competition in the German market to 
the benefit of both parties. Part of the strategy to 
improving their own market position was to cut 
into natural gas supplies to VNG in order to pres-
sure the company to accept higher prices.b This 
anecdote is important, as it did not affect the Ger-
man perception of Russia being a reliable supplier – 
this step has been seen through an economic lens 
and understood as being the imposition of a new 
pricing regime. 
 BASF Wintershall was the first foreign company 
to produce natural gas jointly with Gazprom in 
Siberia. In the 1990s and 2000s, the two companies 
formed an interdependent partnership that devel-
ops the Yuzhno-Russkoye and Urengoyskoye fields 
(Achimov formation) in the Yamal-Nenets Autono-
mous Okrug. For the latter purpose, JVCAO Achim-
gas was created as a 50:50 joint venture. These fields 
are proving to be among the most profitable pro-
duction sites for Wintershall and E.ON (Uniper) to 
date. At the end of 2007, Gazprom and Wintershall 
commenced production at the Yuzhno Russkoye gas 
field, which provides the resource base for the Nord 
Stream gas pipeline with its designed annual pro-
duction capacity of 25 bcm. Operating the field is 
Severneftegazprom, shares of which are split among 
Gazprom, BASF, and E.ON Ruhrgas. The reservoir, 
which is located in the autonomous region of 
Yamalo-Nenets, contains reserves that amount to 
833.5 bcm of gas, making it one of the world’s 
largest gas fields. 
In 2007 Gazprom and BASF AG made an asset-
swap deal enabling Gazprom Group to increase its 
stake in the authorized capital of Wingas GmbH 
up to 50 percent minus one share. Meanwhile, 
BASF AG acquired 25 percent minus three ordinary 
registered shares plus three preference non-voting 
shares in the authorized capital of Severneftegaz-
prom. Gazprom Group also acquired a 49 percent 
stake in the authorized capital of Wintershall AG 
(license holder for hydrocarbon development and 
production in Libya under concession agreements).c 
a BASF is one of the largest chemical companies in the world. 
Its portfolio includes chemicals, synthetics, petroleum deriva-
tives, plant protection products, oil, and gas. 
b Heinz-Günther Kemmer, “Die Großkonzerne Ruhrgas 
und BASF streiten um Gaslieferungen nach Ostdeutschland” 
[Major Corporations Ruhrgas and BASF Fight over the Gas 
Supplies to East Germany], Die Zeit, 1 November 1991, http:// 
www.zeit.de/1991/45/machtkampf-der-monopole/ (accessed 
10 May 2017). 
 c “Yuzhno-Russkoye Field”, Gazprom, http://www.gazprom. 
com/about/production/projects/deposits/yrm/. 
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Box 2: Ruhrgas, E.ON, Uniper, and Gazprom 
Starting in the early 2000s, the German company 
Ruhrgas had been deliberately increasing its share-
holdings in Gazprom; in 2003 it became the largest 
foreign shareholder in Gazprom, owning about 6.5 
percent of the company.a After the merger of Ruhr-
gas with E.ON in 2002, E.ON Ruhrgas and Gazprom 
similarly re-adapted their partnership by using as-
set swaps. However, Ruhrgas/E.ON Ruhrgas denied 
Gazprom from acquiring its own shares in Ruhr-
gas/E.ON Ruhrgas. 
In 2007 E.ON SE acquired 76.1 percent of the 
stocks in PAO “OGK-4,” a Russian power-generating 
company that had the biggest sales volumes in 
Russia and was one of the biggest gas consumers in 
the country. In October 2009, Gazprom and E.ON 
AG closed an asset-swap deal. As a result of the 
deal, E.ON AG acquired a 25 percent stake, minus 
three ordinary registered shares plus three pref-
erence non-voting shares in Severneftegazprom. As 
a result of the asset swaps, Gazprom bought back 
its own shares from E.ON. 
a E.ON Ruhrgas AG (until 1 July 2004 Ruhrgas AG) since 
February 2003 has been the subsidiary of E.ON AG and re-
sponsible for the group’s gas business in Europe, including 
production, sales, transport, and storage of natural gas. 
 
 
Box 3: VNG and Gazprom 
The cooperation between Gazprom and Verbund-
netz Gas AG (VNG AG),a the former GDR gas com-
pany, at first covered the operational management 
of gas flows. The broad cooperation includes a pro-
gram for further scientific and technical coopera-
tion to implement joint gas storage projects, the 
use of high-pressure gas pipelines, and the auto-
mation of industrial processes.b 
a Created in 1969, VNG AG was initially a natural gas sup-
plier in Eastern Germany and East Berlin. 
b “Gazprom I VNG AG podpisali Soglasheniye o nauchno-
technicheskom sotrudnichestve” [Gazprom and VNG AG 
Signed Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement], 
Gazprom Press-Center, 9 January 2013, http://www.gazprom. 
ru/press/news/2013/january/article153710/. 
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Since 2009: A Big Transformation of European Gas Markets and 
the Effects on the German-Russian Gas Relationship 
 
There are three takeaways for the present phase that 
have had an impact on German-Russian natural gas 
relations. The specific structure of the German gas 
market (described above, see pp. 17f.) paved the way 
for the creation of bilateral monopolies across the de-
livery chain up to the distribution level. A close part-
nership with Gazprom provided a basis to consolidate 
its own position in the German and EU markets. These 
close business alliances contradicted the idea(l) of the 
EU’s single-market policy driven by competition and 
liberalization. Finally, it is worth mentioning the spe-
cific relationship between the German gas business 
and the German government: In “the old times,” in-
dustry had a significant knowledge and informational 
advantage over governments.63 Regulations and mar-
ket monitoring were something that had not yet been 
adopted or adapted by German authorities during this 
phase. 
Indeed, the most radical and accelerating changes 
in bilateral gas relations have occurred since 2009. 
The EU’s market reforms have not only transformed 
the market, business models, and undertakings, but 
they have also affected policies as well as relations 
between companies, governments, and Brussels, with 
respect to roles and responsibilities. Since 2009, three 
major factors have structurally changed the German-
Russian gas relationship and are analyzed in more 
detail below: the EU’s internal market policies; the 
shale gas revolution and the subsequent expansion 
of liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade; as well as the 
Energiewende64 and the integrated climate and energy 
policies of the EU. The climate and energy policies 
have turned demand prospects upside-down: from 
the prospect of growing demand (that had driven the 
long-term relationship since the beginning) to un-
certainty and unpredictability. The shale and LNG 
 
63 Ibid., 174. 
64 The Energy Concept of 2011 laid the basis for the Energie-
wende. It has three pillars: the nuclear phase-out, expansion 
of renewables, and energy efficiency. There is also a long-term 
energy and climate strategy, which started in the 1990s. It 
requires structural changes in the German energy sector by 
facilitating a transformation of the power sector and moving 
progressively towards renewable energy and a low-carbon 
economy. It should not be confused with the Atomausstieg. 
revolutions supplement the oligopoly of external gas 
suppliers through more diversified LNG supplies till 
2025. This has offered flexibility and the option to 
switch and has had a profound effect on natural gas 
undertakings, their business models, and commercial 
transactions. Finally, Brussels has emerged as a major 
factor. 
Then came the Russian-Ukrainian gas crises in 2006 
and 2009 and the transit interruption through Ukraine 
in 2009. These events have destroyed trust concerning 
the reliability and security of Russian gas supplies 
and created more negative public attitudes in the EU 
toward any cooperation with Russia. Moreover, domes-
tic gas competition inside Russia has increased. This 
has put mounting pressure on Gazprom to deliver im-
pressive results in terms of European exports in order 
to be able to protect its export monopoly. The Kremlin 
has developed a strong interest in maintaining the 
market share for Russian gas in the EU. 
Political Background – EU’s Internal Market 
Policy and the German Energiewende 
The EU As a Factor in German-Russian Relations 
The EU Commission started its own EU-Russia energy 
dialogue in 2000 to deepen energy ties with Russia. 
For Germany, Brussels and EU member states have 
emerged as a major intervening factor since 1998. The 
EU eastern enlargement of 2004 integrated countries 
with different historical experiences with Russia and 
diverse experiences in energy trade as well. This re-
sulted in more skepticism vis-à-vis Russia. Since 2006/ 
2007, controversial issues concerning Gazprom have 
been more vigorously debated, and the EU has begun 
looking more closely at the nature of the energy rela-
tionship, making an argument for reciprocity and 
asking Russia to open its gas markets, too. Moreover, 
the EU gradually moved away – as did Russia – from 
multilateral governance initiatives, for example the 
Energy Charter Treaty and related processes.65 The EU 
 
65 Kirsten Westphal, The Energy Charter Treaty Revisited. The Rus-
sian Proposal for an International Energy Convention and the Energy 
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started to export its acquis communautaire into the 
neighborhood via the Energy Community. This ap-
proach aims at integrating these markets into a com-
mon energy market by taking over the EU’s rules in 
national legislation.66 
The EU Commission has become the major agent 
of change. It started to push for a competitive and 
integrated internal market for gas. It also initialized 
a sensitive transition that, since then, has covered 
policies, market structures, companies, and commer-
cial transactions. Thereafter, German-Russian gas rela-
tions came into focus. There are good reasons to argue 
that the specifics of the German gas market (described 
in the previous section) contributed to Brussels’ atten-
tion to the bilateral relationship. 
The EU-Russia Partnership for Modernization, as 
part of the broader relationship, faced serious set-
backs. Despite more complicated relations, the EU and 
Russia adopted a roadmap in 2013. The “Roadmap EU-
Russia cooperation until 2050” was supposed to open 
up new and interesting prospects from Germany’s 
point of view. The production of highly specialized 
goods remains part of Germany’s export model. To a 
certain extent, this roadmap laid down a common 
vision, despite the fact that the overall energy and 
general relationship was deteriorating. With the crisis 
in and over Ukraine, it seems that the commitment 
to – and belief in – this vision is lost, if it was ever real 
across the EU. 
The Impact of the Third Energy Package 
When the EU Commission started to address long-
term delivery contracts and “bundled” business 
models with the Energy Packages of 2003 and 2009, 
the market structures and business models changed 
fundamentally. In particular, the Third Energy Pack-
age of 2009 to implement a really competitive, func-
tioning, and integrated EU market for electricity and 
natural gas by 2011 has transformed consecutive 
bilateral energy relations on different levels.67 
Several provisions impacted on the relationship: 
A major focal point were the natural monopolies of 
the pipelines and the operators, which were identified 
as a major obstacle to competition. Regulation (EC) 
No. 715/2009 on conditions for access to the natural 
 
Charter Treaty, SWP Comments 8/2011 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, March 2011). 
66 See in more detail: Scholl and Westphal, European Energy 
Security Reimagined (see note 9). 
67 See in more detail in: Westphal, “Institutional Change in 
European Natural Gas Markets” (see note 41), 35–43. 
gas transmission networks and Directive 2009/73/EC 
concerning common rules for the internal market in 
natural gas are particularly significant for changing 
the conditions in that regard. Both are part of the 
Third Internal Market Package. Under Directive 2009/ 
73/EC, vertically integrated gas suppliers must relin-
quish their transmission systems, thus separating 
the latter from production, import, and distribution 
(Article 15). Implementing the unbundling require-
ments and certifying independent pipeline operators 
(not involved in upstream business) is the responsibil-
ity of the member states and the respective national 
regulator.68 In the case of certification of pipeline 
operators, the Commission provides only an opinion 
on the certification procedure. Third-party access to 
pipelines (Article 13) is regulated through so-called 
network codes governing the allocation of transport 
capacities, modalities for cross-border operations, and 
procedures for setting tariffs and congestion manage-
ment. The network codes are prepared by the Euro-
pean Network of Transmission System Operators for 
Gas (ENTSOG) on the basis of the framework guide-
lines of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER), approved by the Commission and 
implemented by the national regulatory authorities. 
According to the Third Energy Package, exemptions 
from the third-party access can be granted for major 
infrastructure projects (interconnectors, LNG termi-
nals, storage) in certain cases. Exemptions may be 
granted by national regulators in the interest of com-
petition and security of supply, but must also be 
confirmed by the Commission. 
The Third Energy Package affected the German-Rus-
sian gas partnership on many levels. The first aspect 
here is the internal dimension: As these internal 
market rules defined the respective radius of action 
enjoyed by Brussels and the member states, the room 
for maneuver of member states became more con-
strained in this important realm. Moreover, the Lisbon 
Treaty has an impact here as well. Until the ratification 
of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU had no juridical 
status and no real competences allowing institutions 
to become significantly involved in this area. Since 
then, energy policy falls under shared competence 
(Article 194 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the 
European Union). While EU member states possess 
 
68 Deutscher Bundestag, Unterabteilung Europa, Fachbereich 
Europa, Ausarbeitung: Nord Stream 2 – Vorgaben des europäischen 
Energierechts [Draft: Nord Stream 2 – Guidelines of the Euro-
pean Energy Law], PE 6-3000-27/16 (March 2016), 7. 
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national sovereignty over their energy mix, the Union 
establishes norms designed to ensure a functioning 
energy market and security of supply through the 
legislative procedure. Important issues require approval 
or notification from Brussels, also according to the 
Third Energy Package. 
Secondly, the new legal and regulatory provisions 
affected Gazprom’s corporate strategy and business 
models in a number of ways:69 The Third Energy Pack-
age focused on infrastructure projects that have been 
at the heart of the companies’70 bundled approach to 
supply and transmission. The most contentious issues 
emerged from newly built or planned pipelines as well 
as from Gazprom’s market dominance in eastern EU 
member states. Gazprom’s ownership of pipelines was 
not challenged in Germany (unlike in Lithuania), but 
the use of pipelines and limitations to construct new 
pipelines have affected the Russian company’s busi-
ness in Germany since then, as exemplified by the Ost-
see-Pipeline-Anbindungsleitung (OPAL), which con-
nects the Nord Stream 1 pipeline to the Czech border.71 
The above-described provisions of reserving trans-
mission capacities for alternative gas suppliers played 
out in the case of the OPAL pipeline (see in more detail 
below, p. 34). As in the case of the South Stream pipe-
line, the plans to construct Nord Stream 2 again face 
disputes over the legal and regulatory provisions and 
their applicability. 
In sum, the conservative approach of Gazprom to 
the gas market is evident, as the business case and eco-
nomics for Gazprom’s infrastructure projects changed 
under the Third Energy Package, because it necessitated 
unbundling the transmission system operator (which 
cannot be the gas supplier) and it stipulated that 
third-party access must be offered in the EU territory 
to all shippers in case no exemption is granted. Fur-
thermore, Russia had raised concerns that – with 
the full operation of network codes under the Third 
Energy Package from 2015 to 2016 and onwards – a 
contractual mismatch of transmission and long-term 
gas supply projects, a potential loss of capacity, and 
 
69 See Romanova, “Is Russian Energy Policy towards the EU 
Only about Geopolitics?” (see note 7), 863. 
70 For a comprehensive discussion, see: Kai-Olaf Lang and 
Kirsten Westphal, Nord Stream 2: A Political and Economic Con-
textualisation, SWP Research Paper 3/2017 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2017). 
71 For more detail, see: Katja Yafimava, The OPAL Exemption 
Decision: Past, Present, Future, OIES Paper NG 117 (Oxford: OIES, 
January 2017). 
the problem of booking additional capacity may 
hamper its gas trade.72 
With respect to the network codes, Gazprom’s 
concerns about transmission capacities of existing pipe-
lines were mostly considered: Long transitional periods 
are provided for transport capacities set in pre-exist-
ing, long-term contracts; the network code for capac-
ity allocation, which came into effect on 1 November 
2015, permits large capacities to be booked up to 15 
years in advance. On these aspects, the EU made con-
cessions to gas exporters such as Gazprom. 
This was done together with the general criticism 
that the legal and regulatory changes had been made 
without sufficient consultation from the beginning. 
Thus, Russia and the EU were on a confrontation 
course regarding sensitive matters even before the 
crisis in and over Ukraine.73 Transition and regulatory 
changes carry far-reaching risks, in particular in times 
of geopolitical tensions. Structural changes in the rela-
tionship have resulted in growing misperceptions, 
misunderstandings, and increasing levels of mistrust. 
Yet, thirdly, the Third Energy Package – aside from 
the gas glut and the Energiewende – has had an impact 
on German partner companies, because their bundled 
business model of importing, transmitting, and mer-
chandising gas has become unstable and partly ob-
solete.74 Inside Germany, the role of the government 
in the gas sector was transformed from the previous 
period: from providing a framework and mechanisms 
for the “family clusters” of the gas industry and de-
pendence on the information provided by the gas 
family, toward active regulation as well as enabling 
competition and monitoring market transactions 
and price formations. 
The German Energiewende – Another Shake-up 
for the Relationship 
What came on top of these structural changes were 
the policy changes introduced through climate and 
energy policies. In particular, the “German Energy 
Concept” of 2011 laid the basis for the Energiewende 
 
72 Jonathan Stern, “The Role of Russia in European Gas 
Supply”, presentation at E-World Conference, Essen, 12 Feb-
ruary 2014. 
73 Jonathan Stern, quoted in: Heiko Lohmann, “Thema des 
Monats: Viel Gas für Europa (und Deutschland)?” [Topic of 
the Month: A Lot of Gas for Europe (and Germany)?], energate 
Gasmarkt, no. 3 (2014): 4–6 (6). 
74 Jonathan Stern and Howard V. Rogers, The Dynamics of a 
Liberalised European Gas Market: Key Determinants of Hub Prices, 
and Roles and Risks of Major Players, OIES Paper NG 94 (Oxford: 
OIES, December 2014), 75. 
Political Background – EU’s Internal Market Policy and the German Energiewende 
SWP Berlin 
German-Russian Gas Relations 
A Special Relationship in Troubled Waters 
December 2017 
 
 
25 
and was composed of deploying renewable energy, 
phasing out nuclear energy, and increasing energy 
efficiency. Since then, the market conditions as well as 
the political and regulatory framework have changed 
inside Germany as well as in the EU. The position of 
natural gas in the Energiewende has not yet been formu-
lated, despite the fact that it is the “cleanest” fossil 
fuel and could serve as a bridge to decarbonization. 
Still, natural gas is an energy source “by default” – not 
by design – in the German and EU energy mix. To put 
it succinctly: Natural gas relations were deprived of 
having long-term prospects because the level of de-
mand is no longer predictable. 
The German government also started to face the 
Energiewende dilemma of steering an energy transition 
while letting market forces work. Natural gas con-
sumption in Germany, in particular in the power 
sector, has gotten squeezed between the expansion of 
renewables and coal. The combination of weak carbon 
prices and high gas prices in Europe over the past few 
years has led to a decline in the competitiveness of 
existing gas-fired plants – some of them are being 
taken offline. The use of coal versus natural gas-fired 
power generation was a function of relative price 
developments.75 A decommissioning of old coal plants 
is under discussion, but it is challenging from a socio-
political perspective in Germany. According to projec-
tions, gas consumption is forecasted to decrease in the 
next decade.76 For Gazprom and Russia, the implica-
tions are far-reaching, touching upon the Russian un-
derstanding of energy security as security of demand. 
Russia’s policy toward the sector successively 
changed in the 2000s. For the Putin administration, 
the view that energy security should not be treated as 
a purely economic issue became predominant,77 as 
security/political stakes were weighed as being as im-
portant as economic ones. A persistent issue for any 
resource-rich country is sovereignty over natural re-
sources and the maximization of rents. With the grip 
of Russian elites on the energy sector strengthening, 
 
75 For more details, see: Kerstin Appunn et al., Germany’s 
Energy Consumption and Power Mix in Xharts, 1 August, 2017, 
https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/germanys-energy-
consumption-and-power-mix-charts (accessed 8 May 2017). 
76 FNB Gas/Prognos, Konsultationsdokument. Szenariorahmen für 
den Netzentwicklungsplan Gas 2018–2028 der Fernleitungsnetzbetrei-
ber [Consultative Document. Scenario Framework for the Gas 
Network Development Plan 2018–2028 of Transmission Sys-
tem Operators] (Berlin: FNB/Prognos, 19 June 2017), 20. 
77 Romanova, “Is Russian Energy Policy towards the EU Only 
about Geopolitics?” (see note 7). 
Russian “state capitalism” became a reason why geo-
economics and geopolitics are closely intertwined and 
function together. A dominant market position is to 
be exploited for business and commercial reasons, but 
it also offers the opportunity to exert influence politi-
cally. 
In fact, Russia’s role as a major energy supplier 
was indeed a means to regain international power and 
reposition itself in the world as an “energy superpower” 
in the early 2000s. Vis-à-vis the EU, Russia’s role as the 
major energy supplier provided the basis for an eye-to-
eye relationship. On the one hand, it made Russia even 
more dependent on the development and evolution 
of EU laws. On the other hand, when energy markets 
turned into sellers’ markets after 2003, Russia increas-
ingly resisted a rapprochement with the EU. In 2007, 
the negotiations for a new EU-Russian Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement failed. Russia no longer 
wanted to perceive itself as a taker of rules defined 
by an external power, the EU. This was viewed as an 
attempt to intervene in Russia’s internal regulations. 
Moreover, it touches on the gas sector, which is at the 
heart of the Russian economy and a driver for growth 
and social inclusion. Any weakening is a threat to the 
long-term prospects of the Russian economy as well as 
the Russian political system. 
For Gazprom, maintaining market share in the EU 
is vital in order to defend its pipeline export monopoly 
against competitors on the Russian market and in LNG 
exports; here, Gazprom faces strong competition, espe-
cially from Rosneft and Novatek. In Germany, this 
has been mostly understood under the portents of eco-
nomic interest, whereas in Eastern Europe, Russian 
gas supplies were not only seen by individual coun-
tries in the context of market dominance but also per-
ceived as making those countries and the EU vulner-
able to political pressures. The instrumentalization 
of the dominant market position has been viewed 
as being connected to geopolitics. Cause and effect as 
well as the motivations behind Russian moves were 
thus controversially discussed in the EU. Eastern en-
largement of the EU changed the tonality of the dis-
cussions. The antitrust case against Gazprom offered 
evidence in this respect in Eastern Europe,78 but no 
cases were presented in Germany or the liberalized 
northwestern European gas market. 
 
78 See Lang and Westphal, Nord Stream 2 (see note 70), 22ff. 
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Trade and Infrastructure – Amid the Gas Glut, 
a Direct Link into Germany 
The gas glut since 2009 has changed the supply and 
demand balance in Europe, turning the EU market 
into a buyers’ market. This promoted the fast imple-
mentation of the Third Energy Package, as competi-
tion over market share happened at different levels 
of the European and German gas markets. Moreover, 
the large additional LNG volumes available on the spot 
markets accelerated competition in the EU market. As 
a consequence, the imported volumes have fluctuated, 
reflecting price movements. 
When Nord Stream 1’s first pipeline was completed 
in June 2011, the Third Energy Package was approved 
and the gas glut went into full swing (see next sec-
tion). The transportation of gas through Line 1 began 
in mid-November 2011. Construction of Line 2, which 
runs parallel to Line 1, began in May 2011 and was 
completed in April 2012. It is said that the pipeline is 
an affordable means to transport gas into Europe, as 
the costs were comparable with Ukrainian transit 
fees.79 Gas transport through the second line began in 
October 2012. The new situation of the Third Energy 
Package in place resulted in quarrels around the on-
shore pipeline connections. The “Nordeuropäische 
Gasleitung” (NEL) runs from Lubmin to Rehden (where 
huge storage facilities are located) and connects the 
Nord Stream pipeline with the Hamburg-Rehden and 
the MIDAL pipeline. It is fully regulated. The OPAL 
pipeline became a source of contention between 
Russia, Germany, and the EU (see next section). The 
pipeline is an interconnector within the EU, and this 
categorization implies a Third Energy Package obliga-
tion, but it also offers options for an exemption from 
the rules. 
Volumes sent through Ukraine decreased after the 
construction of Nord Stream 1, whereas the transit 
volumes through Yamal were unaffected (see Figure 9). 
An attempt to put together a Ukrainian-Russian-Ger-
man consortium for the renovation of the Ukrainian 
pipeline system in 2002 never materialized due to 
the failure to clearly define tasks and roles.80 
 
79 According to a grey source, transit was estimated at 
€2.5/1,000 cubic meter/100 km in 2012 (excluding fuel 
costs) – a competitive price in comparison with transit 
through Ukraine. 
80 Roland Götz, The North European Pipeline. Increasing Energy 
Security or Political Pressure?, SWP Comments 42/2005 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 2005), 3. 
Figure 8 
German gas imports from Russia 2009–2014 
Source: Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle. 
The existing infrastructure of gas pipelines is a major 
asset to maintain close German-Russian gas trade 
relations as costs sink. Gas pipelines into Germany 
have been developed over time (see map 1, p. 28). As a 
primary supplier, Gazprom is in a comfortable posi-
tion, as its deliveries are under (revised) long-term con-
tracts. Beyond the desire to control the exports and 
corridors, Gazprom has also managed to make sig-
nificant inroads into the German gas market. It has 
expanded downstream into the former intermediary 
segment, into storage and downstream marketing, 
and into trading in EU markets (see Figure 9). The 
company is active along the whole value chain and 
able to collect information at all stages of the value 
chain in Germany. 
Gazprom owns and uses underground storage fa-
cilities (see Figure 10, p. 29). Its important position in 
the segment of storage after the takeover of Astora 
has raised some debates in Germany. Germany has the 
fourth-largest gas storage facilities in the world and 
the largest in the EU, with a total working capacity 
of 24.1 bcm.81 The positioning of the company in Ger-
many’s (and the EU’s) storage system proved that even 
though Gazprom had the possibility of storing gas in 
underground gas storage facilities controlled by other 
energy companies, it started building its own facilities  
 
81 BMWI, Instrumente zur Sicherung der Gasversorgung [Instru-
ments for Securing Gas Supply], http://www.bmwi.de/ 
Redaktion/DE/Artikel/Energie/gas-instrumente-zur-sicherung-
der-versorgung.html. 
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Figure 9 
Russian gas transport capacities and exports to the EU, 2010–2016 (billion cubic meters per annum) 
Sources: “Gas Trade Flows in Europe, in Bcm”, International Energy Agency (IEA) website, 2016, http://www.iea.org/gtf/index.asp 
(accessed 18 October 2017); IEA, Gas: Medium Term Market Report 2015: Market Analysis and Forecasts to 2020 (Paris, 2015), 106; IEA Natural 
Gas Information 2017 (Paris, 2017) VI.58. 
 
inside Germany. Geographical distances separating 
Russian gas fields and consumer markets form a par-
ticular business environment. It takes almost a week 
for gas from Western Siberia to reach the German bor-
der. Moreover, the seasonality of gas demand requires 
a forward-looking stockpiling in the summer months 
for the wintertime. More investments in storage facil-
ities have also been required to compensate for the 
loss of flexibility due to the progressive decline of 
European gas production and the loss of any control 
over the Ukrainian underground storage facilities, 
reflecting a very forward-looking approach by the 
company. At the same time, this gives the company 
a strong position on the market and an opportunity 
to play with volumes. 
Commercial and Contractual Relations – 
A Fundamental Change 
The price slump at the wholesale level started to 
impact on the actual gas trade inside Germany. The 
above-described three-tier structure, the horizontal 
demarcations, and the vertical segmentation had 
prevented competitive gas trade. The large suppliers 
on the first tier passed the price developments of their 
long-term contracts, for example with Russia, on to 
the next level via long-term contracts. The family clus-
ters prevented hostile competitive sales arrangements 
until 2006. Then, the German cartel office decided to 
limit the volumes of downstream long-term contracts 
temporarily, till 2010.82 The new rules did not result 
in more competition because oversupply capacities 
did not exist until the shale gas boom and the LNG 
glut materialized. With spot market prices half those 
of the cross-border price in Germany and with over-
capacities available, suddenly a competitive gas mar-
ket materialized. The number of market areas83 was 
also reduced: from 19 to 2, until October 2011.84 The 
diversity of gas undertakings is high in Germany, and 
the concentration ratios of the three biggest compa-
nies with the largest market shares have decreased 
over time. The three biggest companies own more 
 
82 See: Ralf Dickel and Kirsten Westphal, EU-Russland Gasbezie-
hungen. Über die Bewältigung von neuen Unsicherheiten und Un-
gleichgewichten Ungleichgewichten [EU-Russia Gas Relations. Over-
coming New Insecurities and Imbalances], SWP-Aktuell 30/ 
2012 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2012), 4. 
83 The two market areas are Gaspool and NetConnect Germa-
ny. Both provide virtual trading hubs. The operator ensures 
that demand and supply are always balanced within a market 
area. 
84 Bundesnetzagentur, Marktgebiete und 
Kooperationsvereinbarung Gas (KoV) [Market Areas and the 
Gas Cooperation Agreement], 4 May 2017, https://www. 
bundesnetzagentur.de/DE/Sachgebiete/ElektrizitaetundGas/ 
Unternehmen_Institutionen/HandelundVertrieb/Markt 
gebieteGas_KOV/marktgebietegas.html (accessed 8 May 2017). 
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than 75 percent of all storage capacity,85 but they 
supply to only 32 percent of big industrial customers 
and 22 percent of all private households.86 These fig-
ures are far below any critical index of market concen-
tration. The vast majority of gas consumers can select 
their supplier from among more than 50 companies.87 
Germany has 17 transmission system operators. 
The fact that competition has increased over the 
past eight years has had a huge impact on the German 
partners of Gazprom. Their business models were 
completely destroyed: 1) Their vertical integration 
was split through unbundling, 2) they could no longer 
pass on prices downstream and were locked into more 
expensive and long-term oil-indexed contracts with 
large take-or-pay obligations, 3) and most importantly, 
they suddenly had to compete with others over their 
previously captive customer base.88 The companies 
found themselves bearing the price and volume risks. 
Moreover, the value of their role as “market aggrega-
tors” – that is, managing a long-term import portfolio 
and bringing together substantial volumes of demand 
– is unclear and less inherent in the new competitive 
markets. In the competitive markets, the number of 
hubs and short-term transactions increase and pro-
ducers, traders, local distribution companies, etc., are 
free to make their own contractual arrangements.89 
The sudden erosion of their business model had sig-
nificant implications for their relationship with Gaz-
prom as well. The complementarity in their relation-
ship became less clear-cut and evident, implying a 
redefinition of roles and balancing of interests. The 
most obvious rupture is the different time frames: 
Whereas Gazprom still requires a long-term perspec-
tive, German importers became short-term oriented in 
order to frequently adapt their portfolios to changing 
market situations. Their long-term contracts became 
part of a management portfolio of commodity traders. 
Finally, their relative position vis-à-vis Gazprom weak-
ened, increasing the responsibility for the German 
government to monitor the market. 
 
85 Bundesnetzagentur and Bundeskartellamt, Monitoring-
bericht 2015 gemäß § 63 Abs. 3 i.V. § 35 EnWG und § 48 Abs 3 i.V, 
§ 53 Abs. 3 GWB [Monitoring Report 2015 According to § 63 
par. 3 in Conjunction with §35 of Energy Industry Law and 
§ 43 par. 3 in Conjunction with §53 of the Act against Re-
straints of Competition], 10 October 2015 (Editorial Amend-
ments, 21 March 2016), 253. 
86 Ibid., 254. 
87 Ibid., 301. 
88 Stern and Rogers, The Dynamics of a Liberalised European Gas 
Market (see note 74), 62. 
89 Ibid. 
The Energiewende impacted the corporate level as 
well. The transformation that started with the crea-
tion of an internal market continued. In the begin-
ning was the merger in 2002 between E.ON and Ruhr-
gas to create a national energy champion during the 
Chancellorship of Gerhard Schröder. Later on, Ruhr-
gas was taken over by E.ON and the gas business was 
managed under the roof – and through the lens of – 
an electricity company. In April 2016 Uniper was cre-
ated, uniting conventional power generation (water, 
coal, and gas), global trade, and, for example, foreign 
engagement in Russia’s power sector and natural gas 
production under its roof. Moreover, the utility com-
pany EnBW is also the major shareholder of VNG. 
On the Russian side of the chain, competition in-
creased, and Gazprom came under pressure from Ros-
neft and Novatek, in particular. So far, Gazprom has 
managed to maintain its pipeline export monopoly. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the Kremlin has started to 
closely observe the company’s record in maintaining 
and defending a substantive market share in Germany 
(and Europe) to sell Russian gas. In 2012, Novatek man-
aged to strike a deal with EnBW to supply the German 
electricity company – based in the state of Baden-
Württemberg – with 21 billion kilowatt hours of gas 
per year.90 The 10-year contract supplies a third of 
EnBW’s gas demand.91 The modalities of the contract 
were not very clear, but given Gazprom’s export mo-
nopoly, Novatek markets Gazprom gas most likely on 
a swap basis. 
Gazprom’s opportunities and challenges in Germa-
ny are of two distinct natures. Whereas most of them 
have a European nature (structural trends across 
Europe), the others have a very German nature, such 
as the Energiewende, which is also pushed at the EU 
level. The transitional situation in the EU gas markets 
as well as the gas glut on the global gas markets have 
contributed to increasing levels of uncertainty and 
diverging interpretations and expectations. Moreover, 
natural gas prices have to be seen in relation to other 
fuel prices. Finally, weak carbon prices (according to 
experts, a price above €30 is necessary for the scheme 
to have an effect on companies) did not spur a substi- 
 
90 “EnBW bezieht Gas von Novatek” [EnBW gets Gas from 
Novatek], Energate Messenger, 12 July 2012, http://www.energate- 
messenger.de/news/124516/enbw-bezieht-gas-von-novatek. 
91 “Russischer EnBW-Partner Novatek mit US-Sanktionen 
belegt” [Russian EnBW-Partner Novatek is Subject to Sanc-
tions], Wirtschaftswoche, 26 July 2014, http://www.wiwo.de/ 
unternehmen/energie/unternehmen-russischer-enbw-partner-
novatek-mit-us-sanktionen-belegt/10251388.html. 
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Map 2 
German Network and Storage Sites 
 
 
tution of coal with natural gas in power generation 
till 2016/2017. 
As regards bilateral corporate relations, concerns 
within the commercial sphere have increased. The 
renegotiation of price formulas and take-or-pay vol-
umes for Russian gas were a major issue. Gazprom 
tried to retain oil indexation, whereas spot- and hub-
based pricing have increased their share in the EU, 
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making Europe “the battleground” of gas pricing in 
recent years.92 German companies were among the 
first to receive retroactive rebates. Moreover, price 
formulas have obviously been continually adapted 
to price developments at the hubs. With E.ON the 
contract was revised in 2009 and 2012; VNG received 
retroactive discounts in 2011; and the contracts with 
WIEH and Wingas were also adapted in 2009 and 2012 
at a very early stage.93 
What came on top of the structural changes was a 
simple human factor that had provided continuity in 
the past: Generational change in the companies came 
into effect, with the pioneers and veterans of the gas-
for-pipes deal retiring and a new generation of workers 
with different backgrounds coming into management 
positions.94 
Oil indexation is decreasing, whereas the gas-on-gas 
competition has become increasingly important. From 
2010 until 2012, the situation was tricky: Importers 
asked for a renegotiation of the calculation formula in 
order to include partial spot indexation. This situation 
often led to arbitrage procedures. The gas glut of ris-
ing LNG trade (deliveries (redirected) from the United 
States) has had a huge effect here. Europe has become 
the market of last resort for global LNG supplies. 
What adds to this complicated picture is that future 
EU gas demand is highly uncertain and has recently 
flattened in the EU-28. A rebound is very uncertain, 
as it depends on the overall energy mix, the share of 
renewable energy, and, even more importantly, on 
coal and the price difference between coal and gas. 
Long-term predictability of demand is lacking, which 
is needed for any natural gas exporter. Yet, the effects 
on Russian gas exports are “cushioned” by existing 
long-term contracts. 
 
 
 
92 Anthony Melling, Natural Gas Pricing and Its Future: Europe 
as the Battleground, Carnegie Endowment Report (Washington, 
D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 12 Octo-
ber 2010). 
93 Tatiana Mitrova, Vyacheslav Kulagin, and Anna Galkina, 
The Transformation of Russia’s Gas Export Policy in Europe, Proceed-
ings of the Institution of Civil Engineers – Energy, vol. 168/1, 
February 2015, 1–11. 
94 Based on own observation. The pioneering spirit that 
made up a special relationship among German and Russian 
engineers is, e.g., reflected in common song books and is part 
of anecdotal common history. 
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Qualifying and Quantifying the Impact of the Crisis 
in and over Ukraine 
 
Political Framing and Security 
Up until the crisis in and over Ukraine, the political 
framing of the gas relationship in Germany had been 
overwhelmingly positive; ever-deeper cooperation was 
embraced or simply regarded as business-as-usual. 
However, the crisis in and over Ukraine was a break-
ing point – it was a shock impacting at different scales 
on many levels. Political relations between Germany 
and Russia significantly deteriorated, even though the 
decline began some time before the crisis in and over 
Ukraine unfolded in March 2014.95 Most importantly, 
the “multi-layered architecture of Russia-EU political 
dialogue” established over the last decades crumbled, 
resulting in the end of EU-Russia energy strategic part-
nership established in 2011 and a stalled EU-Russia 
energy dialogue. 
Germany and France have taken the lead in the 
crisis by invoking the Normandy format and broker-
ing the Minsk Agreements. As the EU introduced a 
firm sanctions regime, the member states gave pri-
macy to politics over economics. 
The perception of the “weaponization of gas,” 
which identifies the threat of natural gas deliveries 
as a tool to promote foreign policy interests, gained 
ground in the aftermath of the 2014 crisis, especially 
in Eastern Europe.96 The publication of the EU Energy 
Union strategy concept in February 201597 was driven 
by security of supply concerns in the context of the 
Ukrainian-Russian crisis. The EU Energy Union, for 
its part, was designed in early 2014 by then-President 
 
95 Hannes Adomeit, German-Russian Relations: Change of Para-
digm versus “Business as Usual” (Paris: IFRI, February 2015), 5 
http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ndc_120_ 
adomeit_en_0.pdf. 
96 See e.g.: Atlantic Council, “Disarm Russia’s Gas Weapon: 
Call Russia’s Bluff and Stem Ukraine’s Corruption. Europe 
Should Demand That Russia Sell Its Gas at One Basic Price for 
All EU States”, 18 June 2014, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/ 
blogs/new-atlanticist/disarm-russia-s-gas-weapon-call-russia-s-
bluff-and-stem-ukraine-s-corruption. 
97 European Commission, Energy Union Package: A Framework 
Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Cli-
mate Change Policy (Brussels, 25 February 2015), http://eur-lex. 
europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:1bd46c90-bdd4-11e4-bbe1-
01aa75ed71a1.0001.03/DOC_1&format=PDF. 
Donald Tusk to diversify the EU’s gas supplies and to 
curb import dependency on Russia.98 Since then, the 
Commission’s policy has more or less followed this 
impetus. The security of gas supply moved to the top 
of the agenda in the EU, which conducted stress tests 
at the national and EU levels in 2014, leading to a re-
vised Security of Supply Regulation in autumn 2017.99 
These steps reflect gradual shifts away from a market-
based approach toward EU energy security. 
The “securitization” of natural gas issues is also 
revealed by the fact that future activities to construct 
the Nord Stream 2 pipeline through the Baltic Sea 
have been met with a lot of concern in the security 
and military communities of some member states.100 
The context in which gas relations are analyzed has 
been expanded into other policy areas, stretching 
from economics to trade, politics, and security. On 
the Russian side, Nord Stream 2 has been deliberately 
linked by Gazprom and the Kremlin to the attempt to 
bypass Ukraine, and is thus embedded in the bigger 
security conflict in Europe. At the height of the crisis 
over Ukraine in 2014, the Kremlin and Gazprom head-
quarters both called for a complete end to Ukrainian 
transit.101 It is thus highly problematic that German/ 
EU-Russian gas relations boiled down to Nord Stream 2 
overshadowing day-to-day gas business. 
 
98 Donald Tusk, “A United Europe Can End Russia’s Energy 
Stranglehold. An Energy Union Could Restore Competition”, 
Financial Times, 21 April 2014, https://www.ft.com/content/ 
91508464-c661-11e3-ba0e-00144feabdc0. 
99 European Union, Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council Concerning Measures to Safeguard the Security of 
Gas Supply and Repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 (Brussels, 
20 September 2017), http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/ 
document/PE-22-2017-INIT/en/pdf. 
100 Lang and Westphal, Nord Stream 2 (see note 70), 26; Euro-
pean Parliament, The Quest for Natural Gas Pipelines. EU and East-
ern Partner Energy Policies: Security versus Transit Benefits, Study. 
European Parliamentary Research Service and Directorate-
General for External Policies. Authors: Konur Alp Kocak and 
Pasquale De Micco with the contribution of Faustine Felici 
(July 2016), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ 
STUD/2016/586626/EPRS_STU(2016)586626_EN.pdf. 
101 “Miller: Rol’ Ukrainy’ v kachestve transitera svedetsya 
k nulyu” [Miller: Ukraine’s Role in Transit Will Fall to Zero], 
Vzglyad, 6 December 2014, http://vz.ru/news/2014/12/6/ 
719045.html (accessed 19 December 2014). 
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The project has come under close scrutiny by the 
European Commission, the Parliament, and many 
member states, and it has created dissent in the Euro-
pean Union. Overall, the debate is politically loaded.102 
Thus, the impact of the project (from a European per-
spective) goes well beyond legal dimensions and has 
centered on the applicability of EU regulations on the 
offshore pipeline through the Baltic Sea.103 The applic-
ability of the Third Energy Package was rejected by the 
legal service of the Commission. The attempt by the 
Commission to get a negotiation mandate from the 
Council for “a coherent regulatory framework” was 
also scrapped by the legal service of the Commission.104 
At the time of writing (November 2017), the Commis-
sion had proposed an amendment to the EU’s gas 
regulations to include interconnectors from third 
countries into the Directive.105 
Through the lens of the EU Energy Union, Germa-
ny’s close gas relations with Russia came under even 
more criticism from Brussels and certain member 
states. The project is seen in light of the crisis over 
Ukraine and the challenge to the security order in 
Europe. Thus, security concerns and military consid-
erations surround the planned construction through 
the Baltic Sea.106 Sweden is alert because Russian 
military activity has increased in the Baltic Sea since 
2014. Therefore, the country, together with its neigh-
bor Denmark, requested at the end of January 2017 
that the European Commission assess the legal and 
 
102 Peter Müller, Christoph Schult, and Jonas Weyrosta, 
“Projekt des Teufels” [Devil’s Project], Der Spiegel, 1 July 2017, 
48–49. 
103 See Lang and Westphal, Nord Stream 2 (see note 70); Katja 
Yafimava, The Council Legal Service’s Assessment of the European 
Commission’s Negotiating Mandate and What It Means for Nord 
Stream 2, Energy Insight (Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies, October 2017); Severin Fischer, Lost in Regulation: The 
EU and Nord Stream 2, Policy Perspectives, vol. 5/5 (Zurich: ETH 
Zurich, Center for Security Studies [CSS], November 2017), 
http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/ 
gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/PP5-5.pdf. 
104 Yafimava, The Council Legal Service’s Assessment of the Euro-
pean Commission’s Negotiating Mandate (see note 103); Fischer, 
Lost in Regulation (see note 103). 
105 EU Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Par-
liament and of the Council Amending Directive 2009/73/EC Concerning 
Common Rules for the Internal Market in Natural Gas (Brussels, 
2017), https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/ 
act_-_gas_dir_amendment_-_final.pdf. 
106 “Sweden Drops Objections to Port Striking Nord Stream 
Deal”, Reuters, 30 January 2017, http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-sweden-nordstream-idUSKBN15E1RI (accessed 28 
February 2017). 
political dimensions of Nord Stream 2, which was the 
initial spark for the Commission to seeking a mandate 
for negotiations with Russia on a framework for the 
offshore pipeline.107 Denmark passed a law at the end 
of November 2017 that amends the regulatory frame-
work and would allow for the blocking of Nord Stream 
2 construction through Danish waters for security 
and foreign policy reasons.108 Among the most fierce 
critics are the Eastern and Central European member 
states, and Poland, in particular. The commercial deal 
of creating a multinational consortium was obstructed 
in summer 2016 by the Polish antimonopoly authority 
UOKiK.109 The fact that the shareholder deal met per-
sistent resistance, especially in Poland, led to the 
financing agreement in April 2017, whereby the Euro-
pean partner companies committed themselves to 
finance 50 percent of the total cost.110 In sum, EU-Rus-
sian gas relations have developed within a very fluid 
and volatile geopolitical environment, as displayed 
by Russia’s turning away from Europe in 2014 and the 
pragmatic rebalancing that has occurred since mid-
2015. Besides Nord Stream 2, the exemption for the 
connecting OPAL pipeline from Greifswald to the 
Czech Republic became a bone of contention, too.111 
Poland brought the case at the end of 2016 to the 
European Court of Justice and achieved a temporary 
halt to the auctions.112 Since August 2017, the OPAL 
pipeline can be used, but the final court decision is 
still pending. 
In fact, the number of intervening factors has in-
creased substantially and has made the conducting 
of German-Russian gas relations more volatile and 
unpredictable. 
 
107 Letter of 25 January 2017 of the Danish Ministry of 
Energy, Utilities and Climate and the Prime Minister’s Office 
Sweden to the Vice President of the Commission and the 
Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy. 
108 “Denmark passes law that could ban Russian pipeline 
from going through its waters”, Reuters, 30 November 
2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-denmark-pipeline/ 
denmark-passes-law-that-could-ban-russian-pipeline-from-
going-through-its-waters-idUSKBN1DU19L (accessed 6 
December 2017). 
109 Lang and Westphal, Nord Stream 2 (see note 70), 32. 
110 Nord Stream 2 AG, “Nord Stream 2 AG and European 
Energy Companies Sign Financing Agreements”, 24 April 2017, 
https://www.nord-stream2.com/media-info/news-events/nord-
stream-2-ag-and-european-energy-companies-sign-financing-
agreements-47/. 
111 Yafimava, The OPAL Exemption Decision (see note 71). 
112 Ibid.; Lang and Westphal, Nord Stream 2 (see note 70), 31, 32. 
Sanctions against Russia 
SWP Berlin 
German-Russian Gas Relations 
A Special Relationship in Troubled Waters 
December 2017 
 
 
35 
Sanctions against Russia 
As a reaction to the Russia-Ukraine conflict in and 
over Ukraine, the United States and the EU agreed 
on a wide range of measures sanctioning the Russian 
Federation.113 Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway, and Ukraine, among others, have joined in as 
well. Since March 2014, sanctions have been renewed 
and extended regularly. Primary sanctions can be split 
into individual, financial, and sectoral sanctions. 
The gas sector has not been a target of EU sanctions 
so far, but it is indirectly affected by the individual 
and financial sanctions, as well as the sanctions on 
dual-use and deep-water offshore oil production. Basi-
cally, sanctions (e.g., asset-freezing, travel bans, etc.) 
are applied against individual businesses and officials 
from both the Russian Federation and Ukraine that 
are generally involved – directly or indirectly – in the 
conflict in eastern Ukraine and/or in backing sepa-
ratist groups. Nevertheless, a distinction must be 
made between US and EU sanctions. Individuals and 
entities tracked by both the United States and the EU 
have not always been consistent. For example, Gennady 
N. Timchenko’s (a businessman allegedly close to 
Vladimir V. Putin) investment holding, Volga Group, 
and himself, have been included on the US Specially 
Designated Nationals list because of the close relation-
ship the group’s main shareholder has with the Rus-
sian leadership. OAO Novatek is on the US Sectoral 
Sanctions Identifications list and, as a consequence, 
is subject to US capital market restrictions.114 
Sanctions are also imposed on investment restric-
tions (e.g., limited access to new long-term debt) and 
include technology export bans as well as technical 
assistance restrictions. Germany has continued to 
back the EU’s sanctions regime. 
So far, sanctions have covered primarily oil proj-
ects, with the goal of hampering Russia’s ability to 
renew its hydrocarbon resources. Natural gas trade 
and companies related to this business have not been 
directly sanctioned. Yet, the Russian gas business is 
 
113 “EU Sanctions against Russia over Ukraine Crisis”, 
EU Newsroom, 16 March 2017, http://europa.eu/newsroom/ 
highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm#1. 
114 For more details, see: Aurélie Bros, Low Oil Prices, Sanctions 
and Structural Problems: The Tribulations of Russia’s Oil and Gas Sec-
tor, Recherches & Documents no. 05/2017 (Paris: Fondation 
pour la Recherche Stratégique [FRS], July 2017), https://www. 
frstrategie.org/en/publications/recherches-et-documents/low-
oil-prices-sanctions-and-structural-problems-the-tribulations-
of-russia-s-oil-and-gas-sector-05-2017. 
indirectly affected by Western sanctions, and Russian 
gas companies have adapted to these new realities. For 
example, Novatek has mastered the financing of Yamal 
LNG115 and seems to be well-positioned to attract in-
vestors for future projects, despite sanctions. Novatek 
is drawing up plans to build a second plant, known as 
Arctic LNG 2.116 
Business and trade have become more complicated 
with respect to dual-use provisions; moreover, clarity 
was missing in some of the selected elements. For Rus-
sian companies, the financial sanctions (with the risk 
of US secondary sanctions, i.e., sanctions applying 
to non-US persons/entities doing business with sanc-
tioned Russian individuals and entities, when this 
occurs outside US jurisdiction) are an issue. Germany 
has been central in maintaining a consensus among 
EU member states. Over the course of 2016 and 2017, 
divisions seem to have arisen between Europeans, 
with some politicians questioning the full application 
of the Minsk Agreements and appearing to be in sup-
port of holding elections in eastern Ukraine. Yet, the 
situation in Syria changed the overall mood in favor 
for keeping sanctions. The approval of new sanctions 
on Russia by Washington in August 2017 – in reaction 
to “cyber intrusions” among “other aggressive activ-
ities of the Russian Federation”117 – not only ends 
transatlantic coordination of sanctions, but it marks 
a “rupture” between the United States and the EU. 
The bill was also viewed by the German government 
as dealing a blow to German energy security and Nord 
Stream 2.118 
In any case, the discretionary sanctions of section 
232119 on pipelines opens a large grey zone120 for pipe-
 
115 Aurélie Bros and Tatiana Mitrova, Yamal LNG: An Economic 
Project under Political Pressure, Note de la FRS no. 17/2016 (Paris: 
FRS, August 2016), http://www.frstrategie.org/publications/ 
notes/yamal-lng-an-economic-project-under-political-pressure-
17-2016. 
116 “‘Novatek’ mozhet zapustit ‘Arktik SPG-2’ do 2024 goda” 
[“Novatek” May Launch “Arctic LNG-2” by 2024], Vedomosti, 
29 March, 2017, https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/news/ 
2017/03/29/683219-mihelson-novatek. 
117 Ibid., 1. 
118 “US Sanktionen gegen Russland empören Gabriel” 
[U.S. sanctions against Russia shock Gabriel], Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 15 June 2017, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/ 
transatlantische-beziehungen-us-sanktionen-gegen-russland-
empoeren-gabriel-1.3546281. 
119 U.S. Congress, An Act to Provide Congressional Review and to 
Counter Aggression by the Governments of Iran, the Russian Federa-
tion, and North Korea, and for Other Purposes, H.R.3364 – 115th 
Congress (2017–2018), 2 August 2017, https://www. congress. 
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lines originating in Russia, as renovation, upgrading, 
and new construction may be sanctioned. Moreover, it 
is not clearly defined in the text where an export pipe-
line really ends – endangering connecting pipelines 
as well. On 31 October 2017, the US State Department 
and the Office of Foreign Assets Control published 
public guidelines, according to which the administra-
tion will “work with the European Union member 
states and European institutions to promote energy 
security through developing diversified and liberal-
ized energy markets”.121 Moreover, investments and 
loans made prior to 2 August 2017 would not be sub-
ject to US sanctions.122 
Economic Slowdown in Russia and 
a Turn to Eurasia 
German business in Russia has been suffering more 
from economic slowdown than sanctions, in contrast 
to some EU member state companies, such as France’s 
Total SA, which is developing projects in the oil and 
LNG sectors with companies on the sanctions list.123 
Russia’s macroeconomic performance has deteriorated. 
Since 2014, low oil prices have ravaged all of Russia’s 
key economic indicators. Demand for durable goods 
shrank by almost half, imports plummeted by 35 per-
cent, trade turnover in rubles fell almost 12 percent, 
and foreign investment – which had fallen to almost 
zero in 2014 – was nonexistent in 2015. Inflation in-
creased to at least 15 percent in 2015124 but has sig-
nificantly fallen since then, with an estimated low of 
3–4 percent in 2017.125 So, after the 6–8 percent GDP 
 
gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/3364/text#toc-HF881C 
924248D48AC84B172F50F13A34E. 
120 Kirsten Westphal, “Kollateralschaden in Europa: Die 
neuen US-Sanktionen gegen Russland gefährden Europas 
Energiesicherheit” [Collateral Damage in Europe: The New 
US-Sanctions against Russia Compromise Europe’s Energy 
Security], Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1 August 2017, http://www. 
sueddeutsche.de/politik/aussenansicht-kollateralschaden-in-
europa-1.3611832. 
121 Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft, Ausführungs-
bestimmungen der US-Regierung zu den neuen US-Sanktionen gegen 
Russland (Berlin, 1 November 2017), 11. 
122 Ibid., p. 12. 
123 For more details, see: Bros and Mitrova, Yamal LNG: 
An Economic Project under Political Pressure (see note 115). 
124 Andrey Movchan, What’s in Store for the Russian Economy 
in 2016? (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 4 January 2016). 
125 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG? 
end=2016&locations=RU&start=1993&view=chart and www. 
growth rates observed in the 2004–2008 period – ac-
cording to official statements of the Russian Ministry 
of Economic Development – in 2015 annual GDP con-
tracted by 2.8 percent, followed by stagnation in 2016 
and a slight recovery in 2017.126 
Actually, the economic slowdown started as early as 
2012 amid high oil prices, record-low unemployment, 
and above-target inflation. The ruble came under severe 
pressure at the end of 2014, reflecting balance of pay-
ment shocks from lower oil prices, limited access to 
international capital markets, increased capital flight, 
and concerns about large external debt payments. This 
led to large net-capital outflows ($154 billion, or about 
8 percent of GDP, the highest level since 1999–2000) 
and a significant decline in foreign-exchange reserves. 
Additionally, in November 2014, inflation accelerated 
sharply following the exchange-rate depreciation and 
Russia’s countersanctions against the West (primarily 
a ban on the import of certain food products from 
Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, and Nor-
way, introduced in August 2014, as well as against 
Ukraine, and Turkey in 2015127).128 
Despite the prevailing panic and criticism, the 
authorities have managed to take some effective steps 
to stabilize the financial system and the economy. The 
Central Bank of Russia allowed the exchange rate to 
float, tightened monetary policy significantly, and ex-
panded its foreign-exchange liquidity facilities. The 
government introduced an anti-crisis plan – including 
a bank capital support program on the scale of 2 per-
cent of GDP – and revised its 2015 budget to reallocate 
spending to priority sectors. It should also be noted 
that against all the risks and uncertainties mentioned, 
Russia could rely on large buffers against economic 
headwinds, including a large net international invest-
ment position – equivalent to 18 percent of GDP – an 
account surplus of 4.5 percent of GDP in 2015, low 
public debt,129 and no need to access international 
markets for government financing in the short term 
due to the reserve fund buffer (of which 68 percent 
remained by the end of 2015, compared to January 1, 
 
gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/prices/potr/I_ipc.xlsx (accessed 6 De-
cember 2017). 
126 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD. 
ZG?locations=RU (accessed 6 December 2017). 
127 The sanctions against Turkey have been abolished. 
128 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Russian Federation. 
2015 Article IV Consultation – Press Release, and Staff Report, IMF 
Country Report No. 15/211 (Washington, D.C., August 2015), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15211.pdf. 
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Figure 11 
Dollar to ruble exchange rate 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Financial Statistics (accessed 18 October 2017); http://www.cbr.ru/currency_base/. 
 
2014),130 which has steadily shrunk since then. One 
might assume that there could be a long period of low 
or even negative economic growth, but the country’s 
economy is quite resilient and is not going to collapse. 
Moreover, compared to the early 1990s, when Russian 
GDP contracted by 40 percent – or even 2009, when 
the drop was 8 percent – the current reduction of 
4 percent is not as dramatic. 
Nevertheless, this macroeconomic background has 
created a number of threats and insecurities, also for 
German companies active in Russia, and in particular 
for those involved in the gas business. First, the oil-
price-driven development of the Russian economy is 
questioned. Second, risks related to macroeconomic 
slowdown and currency depreciation are prevalent. 
Consequences of low economic growth – 60 percent 
ruble devaluation (Figure 11) – are the strongest fac-
tors negatively affecting German business in Russia. 
For the companies engaged in gas business, weaken-
ing the ruble is not a price advantage as it is for the 
other export-oriented industries, as Gazprom holds an 
export monopoly, and German companies can sell gas 
only on the Russian domestic market for rubles. Third, 
 
130 Finance Ministry of Russia, “Informacionnoye soobshche-
niye ot 01.01.2016” [Statement on 1 January 2017], 1 January 
2016, http://www.minfin.ru/ru/perfomance/reservefund/ 
statistics/volume/index.php. 
the risks of nationalization cannot be completely dis-
carded. From the Russian side, there is no strong po-
litical opposition or criticism concerning involvement 
of German companies, though. There was some nega-
tive feedbacks regarding the E.ON-Russia accident at 
Berezovskaya GRES, but generally the authorities gave 
a quite clear message in 2014, namely that they are not 
going to press German businesses, create any “black 
lists,” or nationalize any of them.131 
Sanctions and the collapse of the national currency 
have decreased the attractiveness of the Russian mar-
ket.132 Potential changes in Russia domestic gas pricing 
and taxation policies, driven by budgetary problems 
and fears of social instability, also challenge the prof-
its of the German investors active in the market. 
As a reaction to the rift with the West, Russia has 
strived for a pivot to Asia, also in energy matters. How-
ever, projects building gas pipelines to China are slowly 
proceeding. Last but not least, Russia has pushed the 
 
131 “Ulyukayev iskluchil vozmozhnost nacionalizacii aktivov 
inostrannih company” [Ulyukayev Ruled Out the Possibility 
of Nationalizing the Assets of Foreign Companies], RBC, 26 
November 2014, http://www.rbc.ru/economics/26/11/2014/ 
54756f37cbb20fb40db3c931. 
132 Olga Gulina, “Uidet li nemeckii bisness iz Rossii? Tri sze-
nariya” [Will the German Business Leave Russia? Three Scen-
arios], RBC, 5 May 2015, http://www.rbc.ru/opinions/business/ 
05/05/2015/553dbc6e9a7947536b06903d. 
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Eurasian Economic Union, which was created on 
1 January 2015. A common gas market is to be estab-
lished by 2025. 
German-Russian Gas Relations in the Context 
of the Security Crisis over Ukraine 
Bilateral Gas Relations between Commercial Logic 
and Foreign Policy Considerations 
Energy relations became subject to foreign policy 
considerations when the crisis in and over Ukraine 
enveloped both sides. 
On the Russian side, a prevalence of geopolitics in 
2014/2015 seemed to be behind some very volatile and 
contradictory corporate policy shifts by Gazprom: On 
7 October 2014, the CEO of Gazprom, Aleksey Miller, 
announced that “Gazprom is analysing and examining 
its own strategies which guided the company lately. 
The company is re-evaluating whether it is worth be-
ing everywhere on the value chain in Europe e.g. from 
production to retail. […] Gazprom may be more selec-
tive in pursuing projects it already planned because 
reaching end users in Europe doesn’t necessarily 
work.”133 In December 2014, Gazprom did not renew 
its application for a compromise134 that had been 
achieved between the Bundesnetzagentur and the Gaz-
prom joint venture OPAL Gastransport. The compro-
mise had not received the necessary approval from the 
EU Commission in 2014 (despite Commission repre-
sentatives being present at the negotiations). Then, 
the 100 percent takeover of Wingas135 by Gazprom – 
already in process – was cancelled. Last but not least, 
 
133 Aleksey Miller, “Vy’stuplenie Alekseya Millera o prog-
nozax I problemax mirovoj gazovoj otrasli na IV Peterburg-
skom mezhdunarodnom gazovom forume” [Statement of 
Alexey Miller on Perspectives and Problems of the Global Gas 
Industry at the 4th St. Petersburg International Gas Forum], 
7 October 2014, http://www.gazprom.ru/press/miller-journal/ 
706409/ (accessed 10 February 2015). 
134 “Gazprom verzichtet auf volle OPAL Nutzung” [Gazprom 
Refrains from Full Exploitation of OPAL], Energate Messenger, 
15 December 2014, http://www.energate-messenger.de/news/ 
150258 (accessed 19 December 2014). 
135 In December 2014, BASF and Gazprom decided to scrap 
an asset swap, which would have given Gazprom full control 
of a jointly operated European gas trading and storage busi-
ness, including the biggest underground gas facility in West-
ern Europe. Chris Bryant and Jack Farchy, “BASF and Gaz-
prom Scrap Energy Asset Swap”, Financial Times, 18 December 
2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6ed4660a-86f3-11e4-
982e-00144feabdc0.html (accessed 19 December 2014). 
Gazprom’s supplies to EU countries were reduced over 
the winter period between October 2014 and March 
2015136 without explanation (see Figure 12). Commer-
cial reasons for this move, for example to maintain 
a certain price level, are less plausible than strategic 
considerations related to the reverse flows from the 
EU into Ukraine. As Gazprom had complained about 
these deliveries, this may well have been an attempt 
to complicate the West-East trade of natural gas into 
Ukraine. However, because of well-supplied markets, 
these cuts into deliveries had almost no effect. 
With respect to the Ukraine conflict, Gazprom and 
the Kremlin repeatedly announced they would not 
extend the gas transit contract with Ukraine beyond 
2019.137 At the beginning of December 2014, Gazprom 
stated it would abandon South Stream in favor of 
Turkish Stream at the beginning of December 2014.138 
A rebalancing toward Europe began after June 
2015, when a Memorandum of Intent to build the 
Nord Stream 2 pipeline was signed. In September of 
the same year, Gazprom (50 percent), BASF/Winter-
shall (10 percent), Engie SA (10 percent), Uniper (10 
percent), OMV AG (10 percent), and Royal Dutch Shell 
(10 percent) signed the Shareholder Agreement to 
build Nord Stream 2,139 creating a storm of fierce pro-
tests that has not settled down since then. 
The fallout of the severe security crisis in Europe 
and the preeminence of the Nord Stream 2 issue has 
had repercussions inside Germany as well. Regardless 
of the fact that the crisis in and over Ukraine has not 
resulted in a gas supply crisis, Russia’s reliability as a 
gas supplier has been questioned, even in Germany, 
by raising concerns about geopolitics prevailing in the 
Kremlin over economic rationality. First, the German-
Russian gas relationship has been scrutinized in terms 
of vulnerabilities and potential political instrumental- 
 
136 Data available at ENTSOG Transparency Platform. 
137 “Miller: Rol’ Ukrainy’ v kachestve transitera svedetsya k 
nulyu” [Miller: Role of Ukraine As a Transit-Country Will Be 
Diminished to Zero], Vzglyad, 6 December 2014, http://vz.ru/ 
news/2014/12/6/719045.html (accessed 19 December 2014). 
138 See for more detail: Grigoriy Vygon, Vitalij Ermakov, 
Maria Belova, and Ekaterina Kolbikova, “Turetskiy Potok”: Stse-
narii obkhoda ukrainy i bar’erov evropejckoy komissii [“Turkish 
Stream”: Scenarios to Bypass Ukraine and Barriers of the 
European Commission] (Moscow, June 2015), http://vygon. 
consulting/upload/iblock/313/vygon_consulting_turkish_ 
stream.pdf (accessed 20 August 2015). 
139 “Gazprom, BASF, E.ON, ENGIE, OMV and Shell Sign Share-
holders Agreement on Nord Stream 2 Project”, Gazprom News, 
4 September 2015, http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/ 
2015/september/article245837/. 
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Figure 12 
Russian monthly gas exports to Europe (bcm) 
Source: IEA Gas Trade Flows in Europe, https://www.iea.org/gtf/. 
 
ization.140 As a consequence, the positive notion of 
mutual interdependence has been questioned. This 
 
140 See, e.g., the inquiries from the Bundestag to the Gov-
ernment: “Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Oliver Krischer, 
Kerstin Andreae, Dr. Julia Verlinden, Jürgen Trittin, Marie-
luise Beck (Bremen), Katharina Dröge, Annalena Baerbock, 
Dr. Thomas Gambke, Matthias Gastel, Anja Hajduk, Bärbel 
Höhn, Dieter Janecek, Stephan Kühn (Dresden), Peter Meiwald, 
Dr. Wolfgang Strengmann-Kuhn, Markus Tressel und der 
Fraktion Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Position der Bundesregierung 
zu Energierohstoffimporten aus Russland” [A Small Inquiry from 
the Deputies Oliver Krischer [… and others] and from the 
Green Fraction, Position of the Federal Government Regarding 
the Imports of Energy Resources from Russia], Printed Document 
18/961, 1 April 2014, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/ 
18/009/1800961.pdf; “Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Oliver 
Krischer, Annalena Baerbock, Marieluise Beck (Bremen), 
Manuel Sarrazin, Dr. Julia Verlinden, Jürgen Trittin, Bärbel 
Höhn, Sylvia Kotting-Uhl, Christian Kühn (Tübingen), Steffi 
Lemke, Peter Meiwald und der Fraktion Bündnis 90/Die Grü-
nen, Geplanter Asset-Tausch zwischen BASF bzw. Wintershall und 
Gazprom” [A Small Inquiry from the Deputies Oliver Krischer 
[… and others] and from the Green Fraction, The Planned 
Exchange of Assets between BASF or Wintershall and Gazprom], 
Printed Document 18/6349, 30 September 2015, http://dip21. 
bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/063/1806349.pdf; “Kleine Anfrage 
der Abgeordneten Thomas Lutze, Herbert Behrens, Klaus 
Ernst, Susanna Karawanskij, Kerstin Kassner, Jutta Krell-
mann, Birgit Menz, Thomas Nord, Richard Pitterle, Michael 
Schlecht, Dr. Kirsten Tackmann, Dr. Axel Troost, Hubertus 
Zdebel und der Fraktion Die Linke, Das Nordstream-2-Projekt vor 
dem Hintergrund der Energiesicherheit und Sanktionspolitik gegen 
Russland” [A Small Inquiry from the Deputies Thomas Lutze 
[… and others] and from The Left Fraction, The Nord Stream 2 
change in the political framing has led to a certain 
disconnect between the political perceptions of gas 
imports and market realities, because the markets 
have been functioning smoothly and prices have been 
relatively low (see below). This is explainable due to 
the well-supplied markets to a large extent. Yet, on 
the side of the gas importers and traders, this is also 
rooted in the belief that Russia is, and will be, acting 
rationally and not risking one of its major income 
sources. 
Second, conducting business-as-usual gas relations 
as a value and an asset in times of a security crisis is 
overshadowed by Nord Stream 2. The German govern-
ment was given short notice of the project in summer 
2015. Germany quickly took a pragmatic approach in 
reference to the legal situation. Vice Chancellor Sig-
mar Gabriel (SPD) was soon accused of “Schroederisa-
tion”141 when he pointed out that the project was in 
Germany’s interest and that German authorities would 
closely follow the legal/regulatory processes to reduce 
“external interference.”142 The position of the German 
 
Project in the Context of Energy Security and Sanctions against Rus-
sia], Printed Document 18/7789, 24 February 2016, http:// 
dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/077/1807789.pdf. 
141 Julia Smirnova, “Gabriel spielt in Moskau den Gerhard 
Schröder” [Gabriel Plays against Gerhard Schröder in Mos-
cow], Die Welt, 29 October 2015, http://www.welt.de/politik/ 
ausland/article148156440/Gabriel-spielt-in-Moskau-den-
Gerhard-Schroeder.html. 
142 Simon Pirani and Katja Yafimava, Russian Gas Transit 
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government vis-à-vis the mélange and multitude of 
criticisms is based on legal and economic grounds – 
in reference to the legal situation as the landfall state 
and clear application procedures, as well as to the 
commercial nature of the project – and can thus be 
seen as a fallback position. The political framing of 
German-Russian relations by the two SPD-led minis-
tries – the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy as 
well as the Foreign Office143 – relied on the traditional 
dual strategy of containment/cooperation and deter-
rence/dialogue. Economic ties are thus an added value 
for maintaining cooperation, and the costs would be 
high if the relationship deteriorates. Handling the 
Nord Stream 2 project routinely can be understood as 
a strong signal to maintain cooperation and to keep 
doors open. 
Since the crisis in and over Ukraine, the debate 
about German-Russian gas relations is directly linked 
to the security issues in Europe and centers on Nord 
Stream 2. The German political discourse about natu-
ral gas imports from Russia were also influenced in 
2016 by the diverging positions over Syria and cyber 
threats attributed to Russia. Opposition to the project 
was raised in the Bundestag across political parties 
and even within the “grand coalition.”144 The “appro-
priateness” of expanding ties with Russia in the cur-
rent situation of the crisis in and over Ukraine and 
diverging geopolitical positions on Syria have become 
sources of debate. Concerns and doubts about an ex-
pansion of German-Russian gas ties via the Nord 
Stream 2 pipeline project have been expressed regu-
larly by parliamentarians in the Bundestag and the 
 
across Ukraine Post-2019: Pipeline Scenarios, Gas Flow Consequences, 
and Regulatory Constraints (Oxford: OIES, February 2016), https:// 
www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/ 
Russian-Gas-Transit-Across-Ukraine-Post-2019-NG-105.pdf. 
143 “Steinmeier kritisiert ‘Säbelrasseln’ gegenüber Russland” 
[Steinmeier Criticizes Saber-rattling towards Russia], Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 18 June 2016, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/ 
nato-in-osteuropa-steinmeier-kritisiert-saebelrasseln-
gegenueber-russland-1.3040243. 
144 “Koalition streitet über Gasleitung. Die SPD verteidigt 
die geplante neue Pipeline mit Russland. Die CDU sträubt 
sich” [Coaltion Argues about the Gas Pipeline. The SPD De-
fends the Newly Planned Pipeline with Russia. The CDU Is 
Reluctant], Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 20 December 
2015; “‘Russischer Energieexport finanziert russischen Kriegs-
export’. Wachsende Kritik am Pipelineprojekt Nord Stream 2 
und am früheren Kanzler Schröder” [Growing Criticism of 
the Pipeline Project Nord Stream 2 and of the Former Chan-
cellor Schröder], Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 November 
2016. 
EU Parliament.145/146 Norbert Röttgen (Christian Demo-
crat) and Reinhard Bütikofer (Green Party) argued 
that Nord Stream 2 “should be scrapped on moral and 
political grounds.”147 Moreover, building a big new 
natural gas pipeline was criticized in the context of 
climate mitigation. The necessity for large investments 
into hydrocarbon infrastructure was questioned,148 
especially if Germany is to move away from fossil fuels. 
These debates extended into the German election cam-
paign in 2017, with leading liberal democrats arguing 
for a dialogue with Putin.149 
 
145 “Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Thomas Lutze […] und 
der Fraktion Die Linke, Das Nordstream-2-Projekt”, Printed Docu-
ment 18/7789 (see note 140); “Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordne-
ten Annalena Baerbock, Oliver Krischer, Dr. Julia Verlinden, 
Jürgen Trittin, Bärbel Höhn, Sylvia Kotting-Uhl, Christian 
Kühn (Tübingen), Steffi Lemke, Peter Meiwald und der Frak-
tion Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Mögliche Folgekosten durch die 
Erweiterung der Erdgas-Ostseepipeline Nord Stream 2” [A Small In-
quiry from the Deputies Annalena Baerbock [… and others] 
and from The Green Fraction, Possible Consequential Costs of the 
Baltic Gas Pipeline Extension], Printed Document 18/7952, 17 
March 2016, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/079/ 
1807952.pdf; “Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Annalena 
Baerbock, Oliver Krischer, Marieluise Beck (Bremen), Jürgen 
Trittin, Bärbel Höhn, Matthias Gastel, Sylvia Kotting-Uhl, 
Christian Kühn (Tübingen), Steffi Lemke, Peter Meiwald, 
Dr. Julia Verlinden und der Fraktion Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 
Fortgang der russischen Ostsee-Pipeline Nord Stream 2” [A Small 
Inquiry from the Deputies Annalena Baerbock [… and others] 
and from The Green Fraction, Progress of the Russian Baltic Pipe-
line Nord Stream 2], Printed Document 18/13083, 29 June 2017, 
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/130/1813083.pdf. 
146 “Unions-Außenpolitiker kritisieren deutsche Pipeline-
Pläne” [Politicians of the Christian Democratic Union Criticize 
German Pipeline Plans], Spiegel Online, 19 December 2015, 
http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/nordstream-2-cdu-
aussenpolitiker-kritisiert-pipeline-plaene-a-1068744.html, 
Benjamin Bidder, “Nord Stream Pipeline: Worum es im Gas-
streit wirklich geht” [The Nord Stream Pipeline: What the 
Gas Dispute Is Actually About], Spiegel Online, 17 June 2017, 
http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/russland-was-
steckt-hinter-dem-gas-streit-a-1152643.html; “Norbert Röttgen 
fordert Stopp von Russlandpipeline” [Norbert Röttgen De-
mands the Stop of the Russian Pipeline], Zeit Online, 18 Octo-
ber 2016, http://www.zeit.de/politik/2016-10/nord-stream-2-
gaspipeline-norbert-roettgen-fordert-stopp-russland. 
147 “Widerstand gegen Putins Pipeline wächst” [Resistance 
to Putin’s Pipeline Is Increasing], Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
17 November 2016. 
148 Michael Bauchmüller, “Das dicke Ende von Nord Stream” 
[The Worst Part of the Nord Stream], Süddeutsche Zeitung, 8 April 
2016. 
149 Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, “Reden! Auch mit Putin” 
[Talk! Also with Putin], Standpunkte, Wirtschaftswoche, 11 Au-
gust 2017. 
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The German executive branch and administration 
have maintained a low-key and objective course, look-
ing to the Wingas asset swap and to Nord Stream 2 
from a purely legal and liberal viewpoint.150 BASF 
Wintershall and Gazprom concluded the Wingas asset 
swap on 30 September 2015, with Gazprom increasing 
its share in Wingas, WIEH, and WIEE to 100 percent 
as well as receiving a 50 percent stake in Wintershall 
Noordzee B.V.151 For its turn, Wintershall obtained 
25.01 percent in the project for developing Blocks 4A 
and 5A in the Achimov deposits of the Urengoyskoye 
field.152 For Gazprom, this was a move to continue its 
downstream engagement in Germany. The asset swap 
was silently organized – mostly under the radar of 
the public,153 even though the strong position of Gaz-
prom’s subsidiary Astora in the storage sector was a 
source of debate. 
What caused some disquietude in the “German gas 
community” was the abrupt and consequent replace-
ment of Wingas management at the end of 2016,154 
which was not really communicated. It was the latest 
step in a number of similar moves from London-based 
Gazprom Marketing and Trading and Gazprom Ger-
mania. Although many of the people replaced in Win-
gas and Gazprom Marketing and Trading had been 
well-known in the gas world, their successors are not. 
This staff restructuring did not enhance transparency 
or credibility, thus potentially eroding Gazprom’s 
reputation. Moreover, the decision-making process 
inside Gazprom remains obscure, which increases 
 
150 “Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage 
der Abgeordneten Oliver Krischer, Annalena Baerbock, Marie-
luise Beck (Bremen), weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen – Drucksache 18/6349 – Geplanter 
Asset-Tausch zwischen BASF bzw. Wintershall und Gazprom” 
[Reply of the Federal Government to the Small Inquiry from 
the Deputies Oliver Krischer [… and others] from the Green 
Fraction, The Planned Exchange of Assets between BASF or Winter-
shall and Gazprom], 2 November 2015, http://dipbt.bundestag. 
de/doc/btd/18/065/1806526.pdf. 
151 “Gazprom International Acquires Assets in the North 
Sea”, Gazprom International, 1 October 2015, http://www. 
gazprom-international.com/en/news-media/articles/gazprom-
international-acquires-assets-north-sea. 
152 “Gazprom and BASF/Wintershall – 25 Years of Fruitful 
Cooperation”, Gazprom News, 12 October 2015, http://www. 
gazprom.com/press/news/2015/october/article248998/. 
153 “Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Oliver Krischer [… and 
others], Geplanter Asset-Tausch”, Printed Document 18/6349 (see 
note 140). 
154 “Gazprom sortiert sich neu” [Gazprom Re-sorts Itself], 
Energie Informationsdienst, 7 November 2016, http://www.eid-
aktuell.de/2016/11/04/gazprom-sortiert-sich-neu/. 
rumors about the influence of the Kremlin. In any 
case, it is being suggested that the grip of Gazprom 
on its European subsidiaries will be strengthened. 
Trade Movements Reflecting Price Signals and the 
Instance of Supply Shortage 
As we have argued above, gas relations have been 
placed within the broader context of the security 
crises between Russia and the EU. At the same time, 
gas-import flows have followed price incentives rather 
than reflecting geopolitical or foreign policy concerns. 
This is why it can be argued that the “realities” of gas 
importers and political actors have been decoupled. 
The most obvious sign are relatively low gas prices in 
times of severe security crises. A disconnect between 
market assumptions and political perceptions has 
become evident in Germany. The political elite have 
started to look more closely into the security of gas 
supply situation in Germany and the EU. 
Figure 13 
Gas trade between 2013 and 2017 
* Estimates. 
Source: Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle. 
The major fundamentals for maintaining strong 
relations are contracts and prices: In 2015 Germany 
consumed 77 bcm,155 which makes it the biggest gas 
market in Europe since the early 2010s (well ahead of 
 
155 Eurogas, Statistical Report 2015 (Brussels, 4 December 
2015), http://www.eurogas.org/uploads/2016/flipbook/ 
statistical-report-2015/eurogas-statistical-report-2015_LR.pdf. 
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the United Kingdom – historically the largest Euro-
pean gas market – which consumed 71 bcm that same 
year). 
Due to the numerous price revisions, retroactive 
payments, and the increasing implementation of the 
spot component into the traditional oil-linked price 
formula, Gazprom’s prices have already significantly 
changed compared to the classical oil-indexed price 
formula, which was typically used before 2008–2009. 
The German gas border price has significantly de-
creased (Figure 14). Starting from mid-2015, the price 
for Russian gas has adjusted to the TTF (title transfer 
facility) price, indicating that, in fact, the spot com-
ponent in the revised contracts is already quite sig-
nificant, and Russian gas is really competitive in the 
German market. 
Moreover, the existing portfolio of the long-term 
gas supply contracts that were signed already between 
German and Russian companies is huge: Even at the 
minimal contractual quantities (“take or pay” volumes), 
they guarantee nearly 40 bcm per annum of Russian 
gas exports to Germany for the next 15 years (Figure 15). 
Irritations in the commercial sphere are difficult to 
trace but have certainly left marks on the bilateral 
relationship (e.g., the silent replacement of manage-
ment staff described above). Last but not least, Gaz-
prom’s insistence to keep oil indexation has been met 
with increasing levels of misunderstanding from West-
ern partners. The reduced volumes delivered between 
October 2014 and March 2015 without sufficient com-
munication also contributed to the loss of trust (see 
Figure 12 and previous section, p. 39). However, since 
the second quarter in 2015, trade volumes have fol-
lowed price signals, indicating market-based trans-
actions. 
From a Russian standpoint, questions about the 
reliability of export flows are inappropriate, since 
Russia considers itself a reliable supplier. Further-
more, the Russian economy is highly dependent on 
hydrocarbon material exports for both its fiscal health 
and GDP. It is in the self-interest of the country to 
maintain gas trade with Germany. In fact, given the 
decreasing exports to Ukraine and the shrinking share 
in the domestic Russian market, Gazprom must rely 
even more on Germany as its major market, in relative 
terms (see Figure 13, p. 41). 
Germany is becoming a hub for (Russian) gas among 
the EU markets. As aggregated figures from the Bun-
desamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle show, 
imports over the first half of 2017 increased by 21 per-
cent, and exports by 76 percent.156 An analysis of the 
August–September 2017 gas flows from Russia into 
Germany and the EU illustrates that, since the full 
utilization of the OPAL pipeline in August 2017, OPAL 
and Yamal Nord are being used equally – whereas the 
Ukrainian transit corridor seems to have become a 
sort of swing capacity for gas transport.157 
Summing Up This Phase 
The security conflict in and over Ukraine has had 
limited implications for the actual German-Russian 
gas relationship, insofar as the security crisis has not 
(yet) resulted in an energy crisis. It has shaken up the 
trust and confidence of actors and observers, though. 
The “reliability paradigm” has begun to be questioned 
inside Germany. 
Yet, the major impacts on the German-Russian gas 
relationship stem from other, broader developments, 
such as the sanctions regime and the economic crisis 
in Russia. The EU Commission, for its part, aims at 
moving forward to become a more political actor, not 
only with the creation of the EU Energy Union, but 
also vis-à-vis Russia. Among other member states, 
Poland and Denmark have showed strong opposition. 
The US sanctions bill of August 2017 is a “sword 
of Damocles” over gas pipeline projects. As a conse-
quence, the number of intervening factors in the Ger-
man-Russian gas relationship increased over the course 
of 2014 up until mid-2017, and Germany’s room for 
maneuver was curtailed, as illustrated in the Nord 
Stream 2 issue. With geopolitics increasingly interfer-
ing in bilateral economic relations, volatility in con-
ducting gas relations has become more evident than 
in the past. All this is adding to the already high levels 
of uncertainty and unpredictability shaking up long-
term business. 
 
156 Heiko Lohmann, “Topic of the Month: Gas Flows into 
Germany”, Ener/gate Gasmarkt, no. 10 (October 2017): 32. 
157 Ibid., 33. 
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Figure 14 
Monthly development of the German border Price 
Source: Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle, http://www.bafa.de/DE/Energie/Rohstoffe/Erdgas/ 
erdgas_node.html (accessed 20 October 2017) 
Figure 15 
Minimal contractual quantities of Russian-German gas supply contracts up to 2030, bcm 
Sources: KAPSARC, Nexant WGM November 2016, Cedigaz LNG and pipeline database 2015. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Conclusions: Bilateral Gas Relations and the 
Impact of the Security Crisis 
This paper has analyzed the conducting of German-
Russian gas relations at the levels of infrastructure 
development, trade, business-to-business and com-
mercial ties, as well as political framing. 
A recurrent pattern – infrastructure. With regard to 
infrastructure development, a clear pattern of expan-
sion of the (integrated) pipeline system – in line with 
the exploration and production of new fields – can be 
observed for all phases. With the emergence of transit 
countries after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the 
bypassing of Ukraine and the direct link to major mar-
kets have become additional drivers. Although Nord 
Stream 2 can be understood as an expansion of exist-
ing ties, it is also a reproduction of a past pattern: 
bringing the new field Bovanenkovo on-stream, build-
ing and modernizing internal Russian gas infrastruc-
ture, and building a new export leg. Building a direct, 
shorter link from the new gas fields on the Yamal 
Peninsula (as well as new links inside Russia) to the 
biggest and most important consumer market makes 
sense for both sides. It also mirrors positive past ex-
periences of extending the integrated gas infrastruc-
ture. This aspect is important to emphasize in light of 
the vast criticism of the project, which is seen as being 
geopolitically motivated and driving a wedge into the 
EU. Certainly, Nord Stream 2 was designed to bypass 
Ukraine, but it is an issue in which geopolitical and 
economic interests converge in Russia. 
Pull factor: Economics, physical flows, and the German hub 
position. The trade volumes steadily increased till the 
first decade of the 2000s. Since then, gas volumes have 
been fluctuating and flattening. As illustrated, trade 
has followed price signals. Commercial relations there-
fore reflect market-based strategies but have been sub-
ject to some concerns over pricing (mechanisms). 
A strong pull factor to maintain – and even expand 
– the relationship are the shared interests of German 
and European companies. This has been articulated by 
Gazprom – together with Uniper, Wintershall, Shell, 
and Engie – in reviving the idea of running the third 
and fourth lines of the export route through the Baltic 
Sea. 
From Russia’s perspective, Germany is of great 
interest for at least the following reasons: 
 Germany is Russia’s biggest customer; 
 the infrastructure system158 (both transport and 
underground storage gas systems) and its geograph-
ical position in Europe; 
 the characteristics of the German economy (one of 
the major industrial nations with strong influence 
inside the EU);159 
 the size of the market with relatively high levels of 
gas consumption (approximately 61 bcm in 1990, 
increasing to almost 88 bcm in 2016);160 
 reciprocity of investments and mutual interdepend-
ence: German companies have made big invest-
ments in the Russian economy, which makes this 
relationship more symmetrical for Russia; 
 the long-standing political and economic relations, 
which have given rise to a strong network with a 
significant channel of influence, both at the Ger-
man and EU levels (sometimes well beyond the 
energy and economic spheres). 
German companies as well as the German adminis-
tration share the view that import demand in north-
western Europe will increase (because of the decline 
in domestic production) and that Russian pipeline 
gas and LNG will have to fill this import gap.161 One 
option might be to import LNG via neighbors, but it 
 
158 475,000 km in length (including approximately a 
30,000 km high-pressure transmission network). 
159 The German model is essentially based on exports (92 per-
cent of exports are industrial goods). The “Mittelstand” forms 
the foundation of the German economy and is responsible for 
the bulk of revenues. According to data published by Germa-
ny Trade & Invest, almost 10 percent of Europe’s manufactur-
ing companies are German, and generate alone about 30 per-
cent of EU’s gross value added in manufacturing. 
160 Statista 2017, Erdgasverbrauch in Deutschland in den Jahren 
von 1980 bis 2016 (in Milliarden Kubikmeter) [Natural Gas Con-
sumption in Germany between 1980 and 2016 (in bcm)], 
https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/41033/umfrage/ 
deutschland---erdgasverbrauch-in-milliarden-kubikmeter/. 
161 ewi Energy Research & Scenarios gGmbH and European 
Centre for Energy and Resource Security (EUCERS), Final 
Report. Options for Gas Supply Diversification for the EU and Germany 
in the Next Two Decades (Cologne and London, October 2016), 
http://www.ewi.research-scenarios.de/cms/wp-content/-
uploads/2016/10/Options-for-Gas-Supply-Diversification.pdf. 
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seems that Germany is more likely to fill the gap with 
Russian gas. Furthermore, Nord Stream 2 is of great 
interest for Germany, since it would increase liquidity 
on the wholesale markets, stimulate competition, and 
strengthen futures and spot markets – a situation that 
would boost the Dutch TTF hub as well as the German 
Gaspool hub by increasing physical trading volumes.162 
Even if the German hub were to remain smaller than 
Europe’s leading gas hubs in the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom, it means increasing pressure on gas 
prices, thus favoring not only gas availability in the 
German economy, but also its greater affordability. 
Loss of a long-term vision and increasing unpredictability. 
The major change on the commercial and economic 
sides stems from the loss of a long-term vision. This 
has both political and structural reasons. On the one 
hand, the German Energiewende of 2011, backed by 
the Paris Agreement on Climate Change in 2015, ques-
tions the use of fossil fuels in the long term anyway. 
But with the national climate action plan of Novem-
ber 2016, the time span is even more short-term, given 
the strategy of sector-coupling and electrification,163 
and given the fact that gas remains a blind spot in the 
Energiewende. On the other hand, Russia has a systemic 
need for long-term prospects because of high upfront 
investment costs in exploration, production, and 
infrastructure. 
(Geo)political and regulatory uncertainty. For the gas 
market itself, the most incisive change was the adop-
tion of the Third Internal Market Package in 2009. 
This process of transformation is ongoing. Structurally, 
the EU has unilaterally changed the regulatory frame-
work, inducing more short-term elements. The out-
come increased institutional mismatches at the 
regulatory, contractual, and commercial levels. In 
Germany, former partners in the bilateral gas trade 
disappeared, or at least were transformed over time. 
The balance of the past was shaken up. This resulted 
in a lot of criticism in Russia. As a consequence, com-
munication became more difficult and transaction 
costs increased. This was even aggravated by the gen-
erational changes in the staff and management of the 
companies, which added to the complication. The 
 
162 Aurélie Bros, Nord Stream 2: dans la peau de Gazprom [Nord 
Stream 2: Being Gazprom], 7 September 2016, Observatoire 
franco russe. 
163 Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, Bau und 
Reaktorsicherheit, Klimaschutzplan 2050 [Climate Protection 
Plan 2050] (Berlin, 5 October 2017), http://www.bmub.bund.de/ 
themen/klima-energie/klimaschutz/nationale-klimapolitik/ 
klimaschutzplan-2050/. 
“first generation of the pioneers” were pensioned, and 
management also changed with the restructuring in 
German companies. This has changed roles and busi-
ness models (from Ruhrgas to E.ON to Uniper and 
possibly Fortum164) as well as the congruency of time 
frames for transactions between German and Russian 
gas businesses. Although Gazprom still has to do long-
term planning, traders and importers are increasingly 
pursuing much shorter-term transactions in their 
portfolio optimization and trading business. The exist-
ing long-term contracts between Gazprom and Ger-
man companies will remain a stabilizing factor till 
2035. Yet, a (common) long-term perspective and 
vision is lacking. 
Inside the EU, the question is no longer only about 
the creation of an internal market, but also about its 
relationship with Russia. Politics seem to predeter-
mine legal, regulatory, and economic considerations. 
The Commission is looking into taking a stronger 
political role, which is a step forward toward creating 
the EU Energy Union. How the competences between 
Brussels, the member states, and the gas undertakings 
will be balanced is not entirely clear. Further limiting 
Berlin’s room for maneuver are the increasing levels 
of regional cooperation in security of gas supply mat-
ters as well as discussions over a new and adapted gas 
market design beyond the full implementation of the 
Third Energy Package. Regulatory and political uncer-
tainty is adding to a less predictable future for gas de-
mand in Europe. The “geopolitical burden” on natural 
gas stems from Russia’s strong position in the natural 
gas market in the EU. Russia’s natural resource endow-
ment in such close proximity to the EU is no longer 
seen without bias as being an asset to the EU or Ger-
many. 
Germany has been criticized on many occasions for 
placing its economic interests first, at the expense of 
the EU, whereas Russia has been perceived as trying 
to weaken the EU by using German-Russian ties. The 
paradigm of Russia’s reliability as a supplier is openly 
being questioned with regard to future relations. Even 
if a minimum consensus across major political main-
stream parties persists for maintaining existing rela-
tions, a further expansion and deepening of the ties 
(via Nord Stream 2) is openly being criticized in politi-
cal discussions. The project also obstructs the view on 
day-to-day gas relations, which have been subject to 
 
164 At the time of writing in November 2017, there were 
strong signs for a takeover of Uniper by the Finnish utility 
Fortum. 
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fundamental changes during the past 10 years. In 
that respect, gas supplies from Russia are perceived 
by some as jeopardizing major national interests and 
values, and thus running against energy security, 
according to Daniel Yergin’s definition.165 
An “energy security dilemma” endangering business? 
A connection between energy and foreign policy con-
siderations is being made by Russia and the EU. Both 
sides have used energy as a tool and a means to exert 
influence, back foreign policy decisions, and exert pres-
sure. On the Russian side, the moves that were made 
on Ukrainian transit and Nord Stream as well as the 
supply shortages in winter 2014/2015 can be taken as 
examples. On the side of the EU, the OPAL and Nord 
Stream pipelines provide ample evidence of prevailing 
political considerations. At the same time, the re-
balancing of Russian companies toward Europe shows 
that securing market share is of vital economic 
importance for Gazprom and Russia. However, these 
moves are not being met with pragmatism in the EU; 
they are seen rather as being intrinsically linked to 
market dominance and political vulnerability. 
This is reinforcing a certain “energy security di-
lemma” on both sides. The EU’s “securitization” ap-
proach to natural gas relations is antagonistic to 
Russia’s approach of rent-maximization, as it implies 
diversification away from Russia. Both sides are in-
creasingly uncertain about the political moves of the 
other, which is increasing the levels of nervousness 
and sensitivity for risks and threats, resulting in even 
more “securitization.” Germany will have to delicately 
balance economic interests and political values while 
becoming a hub for Russian gas. Moreover, the proof 
has yet to be given that the risk of partial and short-
term cuts does not increase for Germany in times of 
geopolitical crises (see section Conceptualization and 
Terminology, p. 8) and in an environment of less well-
supplied gas markets in the future. Finally, both Rus-
sia and Germany belong to the emerging integrated 
markets of the Eurasian Economic Union and the EU, 
respectively. An encompassing perspective on the 
“infrastructured” space is lost, and the risks for regu-
latory and political fault lines is virulent. 
“Intervening factors” and “unendurable uncertainty”? 
When looking at the period since the crisis in and over 
Ukraine, the list of intervening factors outside natural 
gas relations that may heavily impact on future gas 
relations and that are outside the sole competence of 
Russia and Germany has increased. Till 2017, Brussels 
 
165 Yergin, “Energy Security” (see note 17). 
and individual EU member states have been the major 
intervening factors; since 2017 the US sanctions regime 
has posed a new threat to German-Russian gas trade. 
This all contributes to uncertainty and unpredictabil-
ity for economic activity. This, in turn, makes natural 
gas relations less immune to political interventions, 
and it limits the room for maneuver of the German 
government. 
Outlook and Recommendations 
At the time of writing (November 2017), the search 
for a new government since the German parliamen-
tary elections in September is ongoing, and presiden-
tial elections in Russia are upcoming in March 2018, 
which adds to the fluidity and unpredictability. In 
addition, the future shape of major German compa-
nies is uncertain with the takeover bid for Uniper by 
Finland’s Fortum and the planned merger of BASF’s 
Wintershall and DEA, which is owned by LetterOne. 
LetterOne was co-founded by Mikhail Fridman, a Rus-
sian businessman. Finally, former genuine ‘German’ 
players that had a certain commitment and connec-
tion with the German market and economy would be 
weakened or even disappear. This could have impli-
cations for German-Russian gas relations, as it might 
further change the balance of (market) power between 
companies. 
Our first recommendation to all sides is to foster 
dialogue at all levels166 in order to exchange views on 
the future of natural gas and trade. Even if political 
relations have continually oscillated, natural gas rela-
tions have been fairly stable and have not suffered too 
much from divisions and criticism – proof that, up 
until now, high political tensions have not dramati-
cally affected the business. The most major security 
crisis on the European continent since the Cold War 
has not resulted in an energy crisis. Yet, it should not 
be taken as a foregone conclusion that business-as-
usual will continue. There are many uncertainties that 
may play out, and these may converge with broader 
political developments and produce unexpected, unin-
tended, and risky outcomes. Because natural gas rela-
tions have been a cornerstone of high political rele-
vance, the fallout of deteriorating gas relations could 
have negative effects on difficult bilateral political 
 
166 These recommendations are based on Tatiana Mitrova, 
Kirsten Westphal et al., Position Paper on EU-Russia Energy 
Relations. Constructive Reset and Continuity, 21 December 2015. 
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relations. It seems prudent to hedge the existing risks 
as much as possible and to work on a “code of con-
duct” for a business-based gas trade. 
Nord Stream 2 stands as a symbol and synonym for 
“the sake – and make or break – of the relationship.” 
This is making business-as-usual more difficult and 
delicate. It would be desirable to find a face-saving 
solution for all sides. As far as possible, day-to-day gas 
relations should be ring-fenced as a value per se, link-
ing the two economies and societies. Trust has to be 
built up. 
Our second recommendation, and a very funda-
mental one, is to strengthen market-based approaches 
and multilateral governance. This requires a pragmatic 
and less “ideologized” approach in Germany than in 
the past. The idea of functional rapprochement and 
modernization should be less emphasized, but instead 
an interest-based approach to gas trade as a stabilizing 
factor in the relations and as a factor to increase the 
costs of eroding the relationship should be promoted. 
In Russia, strong economic drivers were (and still are) 
accompanied by significant geopolitical components; 
since the beginning of this cooperation, Russia has 
always regarded Germany as its major strategic ally in 
the EU and has tried to strengthen this relationship. 
Close German-Russian dialogue and cooperation to 
craft stable natural gas relations is necessary to main-
tain this channel. Natural gas is certainly not the only 
area for energy cooperation, but it is a decisive one. If 
conflict arises here, negative spillovers could further 
complicate the situation. As geopolitical moves threaten 
economic rationales, both sides should refrain from 
geopolitics. This postulation addresses both sides, 
Russia and the EU. Germany should therefore stick to 
its support for a market-based gas policy inside the EU. 
It should not be forgotten that, in Germany, a securiti-
zation of gas imports – as pursued by other member 
states – would imply something other than mere com-
mercial steps, which would go far beyond the tools 
and instruments that the German government has on 
hand. In Germany, energy security is first and fore-
most the responsibility of private commercial entities. 
Our third recommendation is to accommodate Ger-
man-Russian gas relations with the EU Energy Union 
and the Eurasian Economic Union. The regulatory 
frameworks of the EU and the Eurasian Economic 
Union are unfinished and disconnected. This adds to 
the uncertainty but provides opportunities for co-
operation as well. 
The EU and its desire for an Energy Union – a major 
project of Jean-Claude Juncker’s Commission – has to 
be supported through German energy policy moves if 
Germany wants to show an interest in European cohe-
sion and solidarity. Russia is striving within the Eura-
sian Economic Union to create a common gas market 
in 2025. This opens new areas for institutional and 
regulatory cooperation and should be exploited. More-
over, legal and regulatory fault lines should be avoided 
through corresponding rules and norms. An EU-Eura-
sian Advisory Council could be founded to deal with 
these issues. 
Our fourth recommendation is to reframe German/ 
EU-Russian gas relations. The EU has embarked on 
an ambitious decarbonization policy that prioritizes 
energy efficiency and low-carbon fuels over the long 
term. This policy does not match Russian interests of 
maintaining sizeable exports of hydrocarbons to the 
EU. Climate issues are not a high priority on the Rus-
sian political agenda. Natural gas has not been iden-
tified as a transitional solution to decarbonization 
but is rather perceived in the EU as a problem directly 
connected to imports of Russian gas. Yet, gas is one 
of the most important pillars of Russia’s energy export 
policy. Russia expects special treatment as the EU’s 
largest supplier. The EU Energy Union strategy, in 
turn, lacks a common, congruent approach toward 
major energy partners. This is a starting point to en-
gage in new discussions about the role of natural gas 
in decarbonization and the pathways offered by more 
efficiency, biomethane, power-to-gas, and gas. 
Fifth, traditional “big” natural gas projects should 
be supported by smaller, innovative lighthouse proj-
ects: biogas, cooperation with fighting methane leak-
age, and improving efficiency of gas use.167 It is impor-
tant not only to sustain existing relations, but also to 
adapt them to the changing conditions in the EU. It is 
also important to look for new models of cooperation 
(including new financial models) and, possibly, for new 
partnerships and stakeholders, both in Russia (inde-
pendent gas producers, power generators, municipali-
ties, startups) and in Germany. New initiatives and 
creative ideas are required to build up mutually attrac-
tive and beneficial partnerships. 
 
 
167 Energy relations should also be broadened. See: Denis 
Chukanov, Petra Opitz, Maria Pastukhova, Gianguido Piani, 
and Kirsten Westphal, Renewable Energy and Decentralized Power 
Generation in Russia. An Opportunity for German-Russian Energy 
Cooperation, SWP Comments 45/2017 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, November 2017). 
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Abbreviations 
ACER Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
AGEB Arbeitsgemeinschaft Energiebilanzen (Working 
Group on Energy Balances) 
bcm billion cubic meters 
BMWi Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie 
(Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy) 
COMECON Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
EEU Eurasian Economic Union 
ENTSOG European Network of Transmission System 
Operators for Gas 
EU European Union 
FOI Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut (Swedish Defense 
Research Agency) 
FRG Federal Republic of Germany 
FRS Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique 
(Foundation for Strategic Research, Paris) 
GDP gross domestic product 
GDR German Democratic Republic 
IEA International Energy Agency 
IFRI Institut Français des Relations Internationales 
(French Institute of International Relations, Paris) 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
LBEG Landesamt für Bergbau, Energie und Geologie 
(State Office for Mining, Energy and Geology, 
Hannover) 
LNG liquefied natural gas 
LTC long-term gas supply contract 
NEL Nordeuropäische Gasleitung (Northern European 
Natural Gas Pipeline) 
OIES Oxford Institute for Energy Studies 
OPAL Ostsee-Pipeline-Anbindungsleitung 
OSW Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich (Centre for Eastern 
Studies) 
RUDEA Russian-German Energy Agency 
SITC Standard International Trade Classification 
TEN Trans-European Networks 
TTF title transfer facility 
WIEE Wintershall Erdgas Handelshaus Zug AG 
WIEH Wintershall Erdgas Handelshaus GmbH & Co. KG 
